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INTRODUCTION
The problem of love has fasoinated thinkers and writers
of all times, while it oan hardly be denied that the fact of love
!has influenoed the life of every man f or good or evil.

But love

is experienced and realized in many forms,
from that most obvi-'
ously manifested in the love of a mother f or her child to the ineffable love of God for man revealed in the Christian religion.
Literature is replete with attempts, more or less sucoessful, to
express the mysterious nature of this fundamental experience of
man in its diverse forms.

Nor, as is well known, has the sub-

ject been negleoted by philosophers.

In reoent years there has

been a renewed interest in the question, perhaps because 01' an
ever widening awareness of the radioal need for love among men
to restore order and ll..nity to a seemingly chaotic world.
The oontemporary Frenoh philosopher, Gabriel Maroel,
(1890- ), who is frequently clessed among the modern existentialists, is not alone, then, in his speoulations on the nature
and meaning of love.

While

r~oelts

professional talent as a

dramatist gives added force to his philosophical expression, the
inspiration and direction of his thought in general is new,
1

•

2

vital, and worthy of the studied consideration of all who are
concerned to restore

philosop~v--and

metaphysics in partioulBx--

to its rightful place of eminence.
It is the specific purpose of this paper to offer an
exposition of some of the basic points in Gabriel Marcel's a.nnlysie of love 1/1

HOl!';-ever, in order to do this wi. thout dOing avoid-

able violence to the profundity and complexity of his thought, it
has

been conSidered necessary to give first a genera.l exposition

of his philosophical views.

.-

In the final chapter of this paper

we hope to show some parallel lines of thoug)1t among contemporary
scholastic philosophers and to consider in PI'''Irt the rele,ted
problem of knowledge in Marcel.
With one exception Gabriel Maroel's purely philosophical writings have appeared in the form of the journal or the essay..

The exoeption is of recent da.te and consists in the publi-

cation of the Gifford Leotures which he delivered in 1949 and

1950. 1 However, he has also written at least seventeen P18Y8. 2
While we have not used his plays in this study, a word on the
rele assigned by Marcel to the drama should be noted.

Maroel

1 Gabriel Marcel, The M~steH of Bei~: I. Reflection
f:'nd b13ste*t, Ohicago, 1951. Onl"y--nerst vo ume of these leotures has een published to date. Volume II is scheduled for
publioation in Fall, 1951.

list of these plays is given by Roger Troisfontaines in Extstentialisme Chr~tien. Gabriel Marcel, edt .b7tienne
Gilson, Pai'1s, '9~9t 2 0 9 . '
-2

A

.3
finds in the drama a medium throueh which can be conveyed the
spiritual oonflicts which man experiences.

However, his plEtYs

cannot simply be considered philosophical dialogues.

Rather, they

are intended to portray some of the concrete metaphysical si tuationa of life.

,And

Thus the ground was prepared aesthetically tor the philosophical investigations concerning being and haVing, death,
love, the test, and presence • • • • In the dramametaphysical thought seizes upon itself for the first time in concreto: the import of human exi~tence first is Bnd tnen-Is
given theoretical f'ormulation. 5
-In this connection it is interesting to note that one of' the most
important of Maroel's philosophical essays, "Position et approohes
ooncr~tes

du

to the play,
AS

myst~re
~

ontologique," appeared first as an appendix

Monde oasa!.

referenoes are frequently found to several of Mar-

cel's essays which have been gathered together and published in
book form, we refer the reader to the bibliography, where the
essays will be listed under the title of the book in which they
noVi

appear.

3 James Oollins, "Gabriel Maroel and the
Being," Thoueht, New York, XVIII, 1943, 669.

W~stery

of

GENBRi~L

OHARAOTFmISTICS

AND METHOD OF NlARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY
!he whole of Gabriel Mprcel's philosophical writings
are marked by his violent reaction against the idealism of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and their interpreters and against the methodlo
reduotion of thought to a system, V':hich these philosophies offer
as a oomplete explanation for the whole of reality.

Inasmuoh as

Maroel began his own philosophical itinerary from wi thin the
struoture of idealism, it may be well, without gOing into the
oomplexities of idealism in its various forms, to oonsider a few
of the general oharaoteristios of this position.
The
one.

prim~ry

postulate of idealism is an epistemological

A subjeot 'of knowledge is in immediate oontaot only vdth

his idea.s and not with things exist ing extramentally.

Between

the subjeot and extramental objects there is an irreducible opposition whioh cannot be dissolved by any process of knowledge whio
will enable the subjeot to be united in any direot way with the
objeot.

Universal ideas whioh are the object of thought aooount

for, exhaust, E'nd in some formulations of idealism cause the
4

entire reality of whatever exists outside the mind.

Absolute

knowledge is thus possible through a dialectical process whereby
the thinking subjeot may proceed from idea to idea and eventually
encompass the whole of reality.

Bxistenoe itself is no problem;

it is simply absorbed into thought, with the result that individual existing things have no ontoloeica1 status.

In such a

posi~

tion, objective knowledge takes on a peculiar meaning, consisting
in a

~~ow1edge

of necessary essences, or universals, or natures,
-"

which the subject confronts within itself but which, if the point
were pressed, do not exist as knowable in the things we sense or
experience in our ever,yday encounters with things.

But at the

same time the objeotive charaoter of knowledge not only dominates
but exoludes any transcendent element in the sense that the object, whioh is an idea, fully acoounts for itself and the reality
it represents, allowing no room for anything transcendine it or
any real partiCipation of the subject as knower in the world of
eA~ernal objects. 1

In the degraded rationalism of the eighteenth and nine-

teenth century man--the individual, the person--is divested of
all reality, all warth.
machine.

He truly becomes a oog in a gigantic

If he is oonsidered at all either by himself or by

1 Maroel de Oorte,
Paris, (no date), 46-52.

~

Ph11osoph1!!

2.! Gabriel Marcel,

6
•

others, it is only as "an agglomeration of function lt ,2 social,
biological, or psychological.

"Cause explains effect and ao-

counts for it exhaustively.,,3

There is no longer any meaning to

words such as mystery, existence, liberty.
It is this that Marcel rebelled against.

While he be-

gpn his philosophicel speoulations vii th a refutation of ration;::;l
ism and the ideal of absolute knowledge 4 and progressed to a pos
tive and integral realism,5 his fundamental problem concerns the
--",,"

existence of man, and it is at this center thnt the various line
and aspects of his thought converge.

Recognizing man's need for

transcendent reality,
Marcel could not remain setisfied with an object which
had been artificially severed by classical idealism and by
Husserlian phenomenology from its setting in concrete contingent reality. More than a decade before Hartmann he was
pleading for a return to ontology. Similarly, he antio.ipated the more reoent inVestigations of Heidegger and Jas-.
pers into the human 8i tUB.tio!) e.s temporal and existential. ()

2 Gabriel Maroel, The
Manya Harari,-wew York, 1949,-r;

3

l)hilosop~i

2!

Existence, trans.

Ibid., 4.
-Cf.
espeCially Marcel's Journal

4
M~taphysigue. 19131922' 5th ed., PariS, 1935, particularly Part One.
5 Oollins, "Gabriel M(lroel pnd the ~tystery of Being,"
ThOUfht, XVIII, 673-675. The nature of Marcel t s realism wl.ll
be d scussed in greater deteil ls.ter; of. inf'ra, 63-64.

6 Ibid., 676. The first important \\Orks of Heidegger
and JRspers dra-fiot appear until 1927 and 1932 respectively,
while the main work.s of Kierkegaard were not translated from
the Danish until 1920 &nd later.

7.
Maroel, of oourse, is not unique in his reaction against
rationalism B,nd idealism.

It is, on the o ontrary , the primary im..

pulse of those modern philosophers since Kierkegeard who have come
to be oalled Existentialists.

On the positive side this

com~on

reaction seeks to center its philosophical speoulation around the
problem of the indi viduA.l human existent, his situation in the
world and his relation to other existents.
this

fI

school" there is an explici t

between life and doctrine.

In all the members of

consoiousnes~.3

of the relation

From this baSis of concern for human

existence, however, sevf?..ral diverBent lines develop.

Here 'We may

discern some of the characteristios of Gabriel M!iTcel' s thotl[;ht.
While, for example, the German existentialist, Martin Heidegger,
previsions the system[;.tic orientation of a philosophy of existence
culminating in the construction of an ontology, Marcel hesita.tes
to affirm this direction.

Although admitting the possibility of

developing a concrete philosophy, he does not believe tha-t; this
It'Vould be a formal philosophy of being, i.e., an ontology.

Hat her

it would be a systemization of the essentiBl exigencies of man
springine from his need for

pn

Absolute.?

Thus, it is not so

much a philosophy of existence as a philosophy of existing, concerned with existents in their very singularity.8

Or as one of

7 Regis Jolivet, Les Doctrines Existentialistes de
Kierkegaerd ! J • .:!:_ Sartre, maye S. Wandrille, 1948, 9-10:8

-Ibid .. ,

304.

8

his better oritios J Maroel de corte t

•
expresses Marcel's particulaJ

emphasis, it is not so much about existenoe as in

--

~

very 12res-

ence of eXistenoe. 9
Perhaps these distinctions will be clearer if we notice

for a moment just what Maroe1's oonoeption of philosophy is, or
rather, what philosophy should be.

"}b.ilosophy," he tells us,10

r'will always, to my way of thinking, be an aid to disoovery ratheJ
than a matter of striot demonstration."

But, we may ask, what is
/

the term of this approaoh, whpt are we seeking to disoover?
Truth, certainly, but for Marcel truth does not consist in the
logical coherence of a system of ideBs.

Rather it is judged by

the sincerity and the authentioity of the experiences which have
led to these ideas. 11

Truth is a spirit, a light:

Truth is not a thi~; whatever definition we may in the
end be induoed to give 0 the notion of truth, we can affirm
even now that trtlth is not a. physic8.l object, that the
search for truth is not a physioCtl process, that no general ...
izations that apply to physioE'.l objects Dnd processes can
apply also to truth. 12
To have objective knowledge of something is to know that thing in
its essence, its neoessity, and its eternity.

It is to know it

9 La Phi1osophie de G. M., 43. Cf. Etienne Gilson,
Existentialism; Chr~tien: Gabriel Marcel, 7.
10

!lstery of

Bein~t

1-2.

11 Roger ,Troisfontaine, '8xistenti8lisme Chretien:
Gabriel Marcel, ed. E. Gilson, 210.
12

Marcel, Mystery of Being, 18.

10

•

en almost infinite field of investigation open to him, the field

of the manifold situations of human existence.

In these situa-

tions he seeks to penetrate the meaning of the "In and the pro~ound depths of being in which and by which ttl am."17

We have

sa.id that for Marcel philosophy is perpetually progressive, and
thiS is because i'ts object is fundamentally historic.

Hence, it

is built up (or as Marcel would prefer to say. it is hollowed out
or it lays a foundation)

~t

the same time that it is precticed.
~

It is engaged in life its,elf; it is lived!!! ~ exercito. 18
For a philosophy so conceived Marcel sees in phenomenology a method best adapted to its investigations.

!Jet us keep

in mind from the outset, however, that for Marcel the phenomenological method is and remains a tool, an instrument for examine ..
tion, Dnd in no way is identified with the result aChieved.
While it remains true that
• • • between a philosophical investigation and its final
outcome, there exists a link which cannot be broken wi-thout
the summing up itself immediately lOSing all reality, 9
this is not to say that this "summing up" is Simply the totality
of the investigations pursued, as would be the case in Husserlts
system of phenomenology.

17 Maroel,

~

Refus, 89.

!:.t Philosophie ~ ft. !_,
19 Maroel, ~~ste;y £! Being, 5.
18

de Gorte,

44.

11

•
In the hands of Mrrcel, the instrument is used for a de'"

scriptXve analysis of concrete human situations.
v:e

He accepts what

call our everyday experiences, and with acute profundity ex-

amines them in all their

tr~1gic

an.d hopeful implications.

He is

concerned to show the intention of these experiences rather than
their psychological content, without attempting to explflin them
by reducing them to their Simple elements. 20
noted that the situation being
PDa

~1nalyzed

Further, it is to bE

is taken in its entirety

all the aspects of a person involved/in en experience of what ...

ever nattrre are considered.

For example, in his discussion of thE

question of the union of soul and body, f4l.arcel does not prescind
from the feeling one has of an intimate connection between "me and
my body."21

On the contrary, the subjective aspect of feelins in

this instance takes its place alone side of the evidence of unity
manifested externally and is inoluded in the totality of the livec
experience.

Indeed, it seems to be one of the characteristio

marks of Marcel's philosophy that, while it becomes

necessf~.ry

at

times fo!' him to "distineuish in order to unite," he is constantlJ
awere of and stresses the feet of man's unity.

Let us cite just

a few of the many texts whioh brine out this emphasis;

Riooeur, Marcel at Jaspers, 77; cf. ~arcel, Du
proc~deral suivant 18 m~thode qui mtest habIruelle
et qui consiste dans une E:nalyse non p~lS du fait de consoience,
mas plutat du contenu de conscience, c'est-A.-dire de oe que la
conscience a r~ellement en vue dans un certain nombre de situations-types, nettement discernables les unes des autres."
21 Mvstery of Being, 94.
Refu~t

20

55. "Je

12

•

• •• we cannot isolate, in order to transform them into
distinct entities, the various ",\spects of a. single life,
'which is, precisely, the life of .2!!! self .22
• •• we must be very oareful indeed to avoid artificielly
separating oue level of the self from the other; we must
avoid assuming that the self of reflection E.md ingfltheredness is not the same self as that of lust and vengeanoe.
We are not in the-pE'ysical world. .;:nd oanrlot say, "There is
this self, there is that self," as we might say, "There is
an apple, there is an orange." I would prefer to call our
two selves, wl1ich are not really two selves, or our two
levels of the self--\'ihich have not, however, the sharp
me clsureable gap between them that the notion of a level
physioally implies--different module,tiona of eXistence. 2 3
It would certainly not be proper to"'deny the legitimacy of
making distinctions of order wl thin the unity of a, living
subject, who thinks and strives to think of himself. But
the ontological problem can only arlse oeyond such distinctions, and for the living being grasped in his full unity
and vitality.24
It is perhaps obvious that the use of the phenomenological method in a philosophy of the concrete will in all likelihood be aooompanied by concrete examples and illustrstions.
However.,. for MaIoel the illustrative device is an essential com...
ponent of the method, without which the truth to be attained
would never develop.

As he says:

• • • for a philosophic approach like ours, whioh is essentially a concrete rather than an abstr~:ct approE:ch, the
use of examples is not merely an auxiliary process butt on
the contrary t an essential part of our method of progreS!3ing. An example, for us, is not merely an illustration of

22

Ibid., 69.

23

-Ibid",

130.

nRtA'r

M:nQ'1 AnN .1949.

24
Woa+mi

Gabriel Maroel, Being

~ Hevin~,
1'/1.

trans. Katherine

13

an idea which v','as fully in being even before it wes illustrated. I vvould rather compare the pre-existine; idea to a
seed; I have to plpnt it in the genial soil that is constituted by the ex£'mple before I can really see what sort of a
seed it is; I keep a v,lltch on the soil to see what the seed
grows up into.25
The results of investigations at this level do not give
ontological truths, however.
~ogy

In fact, for a Single phenomen-

severe.l truths are possible, which would not be the c[;se it'

(perience were a purely objective fact.

1

•

integral part of the observed date, the

r:r:-ding to the points of view he adopts. 26

But if the observer is
~xperiences

difl'er

BC-

Hence, while remain-

tg on the phenomenological level, the philosopher cannot make

ly pretentions to a universally valid rnetaphysics. 27

For Maroel

)wever, these preliminary investigations are an approach Hnd a

tide.

They merely provide a series of deeply probed experit'mces

)inting to something beyond the observe.ble date and revealing

m's need for trr:;TIscendence.

The nature of this exigency in man

) well ps the nature of its object, Bre the more properly ph11o-

>phical questions, not to be solved, of course, but to be lived.

t

this higher level of' discourse, the distinctive instrument of

25
26
rr~tienne,

~!!yste!l

2f

Beins, 116.

Roger Troisfontaine. Existentialisme et
Peris, 1946, 77-78.

Pens~e

27 It is in their failure to recognize the limits of
tenomenology and in their consequent claim to describe the
lthentic unig,ue experience that the philosophers of £1,theistic
~sp8ir are to be criticized.
(Cf. ibid., 78.)

-

I"""

14 •

philosophica.l

thout~ht,

i.e., reflection, is brought into play.

',::e shall see later in some detail the importa.nt place of reflec-

r;ion in Marcel's philosophy.
~ndicate

its r6le.

At this point let us just briefly

There are t"vo stages of reflection.

The

if'irst or primary reflection on an experience tends to dissolve it
~nto

its several parts so far as they can be separated and viewed

fi,s objects apart.

Seoondary reflection. hov, ever , recognizes and

reconquers the unity of that experienoe in an essentially recuperative movement of thought,

As it is the vital purpose of phil-

osophy to reveal man's conorete situation in its totality, the
stage of reflection is the tfspecial high instrument of
philosophical research. fl28

~atter

There is one further point which should be oonsidered
before proceeding to an exposition of Maroel's philosophy.

Mar-

cel has been r:: ooused of developine a philosophic view

is

intrinsioe.lly oonneoted with
beliefs,29
~he
~uch

~md

~'.hich

dependent upon his religious

perhaps beoause of his frequent preoccupation with

Christian notions of faith, hope, charity and salvation.
criticisms, however, reveal a thorough misunderstanding of

MBIcel t s method and starting point.

28

First of 8.11, it is a Y.nOV'Jn

M.arcel, Myster'y of Being, 83.

29 Of. Merjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom, Chioago, 1948,
130-132; Guido de Ruggiero, Existentialism. taslntesration of Man'
Soul, ed. Reyner Heppenstall, New York, '~48t 46, and Rappen.:stall's introduction, pE'.ge 11.

15

•

;fact that Marcel was not baptized until 1929, when he joined the
Cr::tholic Church, fifteen years

f~f>ter

the original entry in his

first Journal and six years ai'ter its completion.

Now, v,hile it

is true that his subsequent writings and lectures contain marked
developments end some revisions. it is equally apparent to anyone
who will subject his earlier and later works to a comparative
(,nalysis that the conclusions to which he is led by his more mature reflection are imp11cit in the first recordings of his speculation.

Nor can Marcel be charged with --confounding the natural

and the supernatural:
I should like to note that from my own standpoint the
distinotion between the na{5ural £:md the supernc.tural must
be rigorously mpintained."

Marcel reoognizes the specific nature of the philosophic
discipline and does not base his thought on ! pI'iori supposi tiona
of the Christian revelation.

Throughout the Journal he is con-

cerned with speoulation on the act of faith, an:>lyzing the describing the concrete conditions
such an 8ct.31

n~oeasary

for a person to place

Later, after his oonversion he describes his

spiritual experience ~:md reflects on his ovvn aot of faith,32 but

183.

30

M·sI.'cel, Philosophy of Existence, 30.

31

Journal

M~taphysigue,

especially 33-39, 68-73, 182-

32 Bein5 ~ Hevin,€S, especiElly 203-216;
espeCially, 158-182.

~

Refus,

his perspeotive alv'Jays remains philosophio.

16
•
He legitime.tely neg-

lects oertain aspeots of his experience v;ihioh vvould be of perticular interest to the theologian or at least only mentions them in
pa.ssing. 33

ttThe philosopher," MflY.'cel tells us,34 must not be

apart from hiG world."

If he is to reveal the significanoe of the

human experienoe he must himself be implicated in it and must take
into aOcoWlt all that it implies of oontingenoy and relative necessity.

He oan thus no more abstract from the historic situation
./

in whioh he is pIa oed than be oan disregard the more immediate
elements of oonsoiousness and feeling.

Maroel himself aptly

justifies his position and direotion on this pointe
A serious objeotion remains to be mentioned. It will
perhaps be said r All that you have said implies Em unformulated refe:rence to the data of Christianity and can only
be understood in the light of these data. Thus we understand whflt you mean by presence if iNe think of the Eucharist
and what you mean by oreative fidelity if we think of' the
Ohurch. But whnt oan be the value of suoh a philosophy
for those who are a-Christie.n--for those who ignore Christianity or ~ho do not aocept it? I would enswer: it is
quite possible that the existence of the fundamental O11ristian data may be necessary in fact to enable the mind to
oonoei ve some of the notionswfiI"Cfi I have ai;tempted to
analyse; but these notions oannot be said to depend on the
data of Christianity, and they do not ~resup¥0se it. On
the other hand, should I be tolat'Eiit he in el1ect must
leave out of account anything whioh is not a universHl da.ta
of thinking as such, I would say that this claim is exaggerated and in the last anelysis, illusory. Now, as at

33 Pierre Oolin, in B:x1stentialisroe Ohretien: Gabriel
Mercel, ad. Gilson, 13-14.
34

Mysterl!?!. Beil1f£, 36.

17

•

any other time,',he philosopher is plro;ced in e given historical situation from w\uch he is most unlikely to abstract
himself completely; he would deceive himself if he thought
that he could create a complete void both within and around
himself. Now this historical situation implies as one of
its essential data the existence of the Christian fact-quite independently of whether the Christian religion is accepted and its fundamental assertions are regarded as true
or false. Whet appears to me evident is that we cannot
rea.son today as though there were not behind us centuries of
Christianity, just as, in the domftin of the theory of knowledge, we ca.nnot pretend that there have not been centuries
of positive science. But neither the existence of Christianity nor that of positive science pleWs in this connection
.more than the role of a fertilising principle. It favors
the development of certain ideas wh~h ~Jve might not have can..
cei ved vlJ:Lthout it. This development may take plnce in what
I would call para-Christian zones; for myself, I have experienced it I1lOLe than twenty years before I had the ramo·test thought of becoming a Cntholic.35

35

PhilosgphY!?! I!b<istence, 29-30.

•
OHAPTFlR III

GABRIEL MAROEL' S PHILOSOPHY OJ!' F:XISTtNG
It is a constant

haZf~rd

of a.ny philosophy based on ex-

perience to succumb to the temptation of subjectivism.

Gabriel

Marcel is acutely aware of this danger and constantly strtves to
avoid the pitfall.

Most of his critics and 1ntllrpreters agree
,-

thpt he has been successful here.'

It is true, of course, that

his epproach has been and will no doubt remain,

~ubjeotive,

but

there is a difference between authentic subjecttvity and subjecti vism which is the difference between truth anQ error.

l'he pat

between subjectivism and pure objectivity whiohMarcel has chose
to follow is no doubt etroit

e~

sinueux, but t

following pages will show, it can be safely

a~

we hope the

tr~::\tersed.

The very notion of experience reveals the dangers.
perienoe is not something that is given to us

f~om

:E<lX

the outside,

'i.e., it is not something that can be dissected into any number
of parts which can be
to a given situation.

anely~ed

and which taken together add up

Wi thin an experience there is, so to

1 E.g. J Troisfonta.ines, Existentiuliame et l'enst,e
OhrC§tienne, 17 .. 18; Colin, in Existentialism.,! Oh~ien: Gabriel
ME:rcel, ad. Gilson, 29-31; R1coeur, r;~aroel !1~spers, 79-S3.

18

19
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speak, an element which is not reducible to a. given or an object,
and it is this element in fact which renders the situation a

IUnified whole.
sub ject , the

tt

For within any and every experience there is its
I", who is intimately involved and whose involve-

ment gives meaning to the experience.
p

situation which is

~,

I can never stand away from

view it from the outside, abstract from

my own engagement in it, and still matntain that it is !:1t experi-

ence.
IJet us see how these remarks bear on what, from one
point of view, is the starting point of

}1!t~.rcel'

s philosophy.

YJha.t I can neither prove nor place in doubt is my o\vn existence.
This is what Y..arcel calls the existential 1ndub1table, the touchs·):one or primordial existent, which if it were a.enied would preclude the possibility of a.ffinnine the existence of anything
else.2

The self here involved is not, however, the 111" of the

Cartesian coSito, the epistemological self.
mediately existential

"I",

It is rather the im-

which can only be recognized and not

deduoeds
La rba11tb que lecosito r~v~le •• test dtun ordre tout
d1ff#Jrent de 1 t existence dont neus tentons ici non point

tant d t ~ta.blir que de reconnlHBre, de constater m~te.phy
siquement Ie. p:riorit~ absolue.

lIt1Yste;y.2f. Be1n~t 88; of. Journal ~1~tal'h,ys~que, 310314; Du Refus, 25*
2

-
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Au d~phrt de cette investigation, il nous faudra pla.cer
un indubitable, non pas logique ou rationnel, mais existential; 8i l' existenoe n' est p<~ s Ii. 1 t origine, elle ne sera
nulle part; il nty a P[;3.S, je pense, de passage a I t existence
qui ne soit esoamotage ou trioheria.4
Howevp.Z', this privileged recognition of the existential "I'f has
as its immediate oorrela.tive the reoognition of the selt as
existing in the world: nOe qui m'est indubitablement donne, c'est
l'experience contuae at globale

du

monde en tant qU'existant."5

Now, the affirmation of this world of existents is based on

my

awareness of myself as existing in or with my body, 1.e., as an
incarnate being:
• • • mon corps est le rep~re par rapport auquel se posent .
pour mol les existants, at, ajouterai-je, s'etablit 18. demarca:tion entre existence et non-existence. 6
Through refleotion on this first datum of consciousness. I cun
coma to an explicit recognition of other existents.
It would perhaps be ',veIl to follow in some detail the
phenomenological

an[~.lysis

of this experience of "me and my bodytf

and see hm'l some of the roBin chara.cteristics of Marcel t s thought
follow from or pertain to it..

Actually, one could ju.st as well

consider any of the human experiences that :M8.roel subjects to
scrutiny, for example, fidelity or hope, and show equally well
the import of his speculation.

4

-Du Refu3,

25.

Thl RA:fus

28
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£

We have ohosen this pnrticuler

~etaph~s1que,

313.
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experience as a center, however, for two main reasonss

It

(1)

will have speoific application to ME:rcel t S treatment of the notion of havin,S, to be oonsidered in the next chapter; and'(2) in
his first systematic and full-blown presentation of his philosophy

(the Gifford Lectures), Mercel himself uses this as a start-

ing point.
wrwt is this "In of which I say, "I exist", and of
vvhich I am aware as being somehow or other oonnected with my
body?

"

It seems that I can say th:1t I have my body, or that I

use my body, or again that I am or f',m not my body..

1!;hat is the

significanoe of ell these statements which from one point of view
appear to be entirely valid, yet aotually do not express the full
ness of the oonjunction?
'l'IJ

uld seem to indioate

f'

The use of the possessive pronoun
reletion of ownership.

~

If I then con-

sider my body as Simply my instrument, I am faoed with the questions an instrument of what?

An instrument is merely a means of

extending the virtual powers of its user, and if I say that my
body is the instrument of my soul I attribute to my soul the
virtual powers of the body, of which the soul is supposed to assure the

actualiz[~t1on.

soul into a body.

In effect, this is simrly to oonvert the

And the same question is again in order,

leading to an infinite regress. 7 The body is not necessery to
the soul only clnd

espec1~llly

in the fashion of an instrument.

22
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Rather, the body serves as e k1nd of sympathetio mediation prior
to the instrumental mediation,

Q
(J

although both are intimately

mineled.
Can I say t;hat I am identioal \\1. th my body?

position implicitly nullifies the

"I" in

a. gross materie.lism,9

while to deny any conneotion bet\-veen my self and
deny an immediate

and

Suoh a.

my

body 1s to

obvious fact of experience.

We seem then to be able to maintain no knowable rela-

tion between the self and the body.
prising.

And this should not be sur-

For as soon as we at'firm a relation

we

set up two te.rms,

each of whioh is Bn objeot that can be defined and verified.

The

two terms of the relation beoome a problem and a matter for sc1But as such I place myself outside the rela-

entific knowledge.

tion, oonsidering myself then as a thi'rd iihing somehow relflted
to this body.10
moment I treat,

The!l no longer has any significance:

my

"The

body as em ob ject of scientific knowledee, I

banish myself to 1nfin1ty. "'1

Thus J we have an 8,pparent paradox:

Etre 1ncarn~. c'est s'appara!tre comme corps, oomme
corps-ci, sans pouvoir stident1fier A lui, sans pouvoir
non plus sten d1stinguer--identification et distinction
06

8

Journal M#'tap~'si'lue, 239; of. Mysterl .2! ~e1!y?, 101

9

~

Refu!=! J 30

10

~bid ••

11

Being!.!!!! !!.Bving, 12; ct. Journal

31-32.
P&~tal?hys1'lue,

252.
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~tant des op~rations corr~latlve Itune de l'autre, mais qui
ne peuvant s'exercer que dans le sphere les objets. 12

This fundamental link uniting me to my body is in the order of
the meta-problematic, the order of mystery.
Before gOing further, let us consider the oelebrated
a.nd important distinotion that Marcel makes between problem and

mystery.

A mystery 1s a problem which encroaches upon its O~~l data,
invading the!n, as it were, and thereby transcending itself
as a simple problem. 1 3
/
A mystery cannot be reduced to the elements that constitute it

nor to prior element S Emd, consequently , discursive thought is
not possible.

It transcends the order of subject-objeot.

problem, on the other hand, is concerned preoisely
subject-object relationship end can be

~melyzed

~dth

A

this

in terms of its

precedent elements, while in the prooess one term or set of terms
can be substituted for another.
A problem is something which I meet, w~l1ch I find complete before me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and
reduce. But a mystery is something in which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as fi sphere
where the distinction between whet is in me and what is before me loses its meaning Emd its initipl validity.. /\ genuine problem is subjeot to an eppropriate technique by the
exercise of which it is defined: whereas 8 myst U ' by deti'"
nition, transcends every conceivable tec~~ique. f 4

12
13

14

-Du Refus,

PhilesopBY
Being

31.
~

Existence t 8.

~ Hav1n~,

117.
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.Philosoph;)T is above all concerred with mystery and i·t is in this
that it is distinguished from the sciences properly so-called
whj.ch know only problems. 15

It is the cap 1tal error of philoso-

phY to degrade m;ystery by attempting to convert it into B problem
or into pure objectivity under the pretext of thus mc:king it more
intelligible. 16
However, we must be careful to avoid confusing the ordex
of mystery

"~th

the unknowable.

l'orare du OOnnEt1ssant."17

"11 nty a de

myst~re

que dans

-'

To apprehend a mystery is precisely to

reoognize it as mystery and not susceptible to being formulated iD
objective terms or grasped in objective concepts, but this reoognition is itself an essentiAlly positive act of the mind. based on
a funda.mentAI intu! tion v.hich is, so to speak, broken up in a. reflection and recovered and understood in its unity in recollection. 18

15

!later:

16

Beins

17

Journal

~

Being, 213-216.

~ Havir~,

117.

M~taphlsiquet

160.

18 ¥!i~ and Hf:lVin~, 118: "The recognition of rnystery
is e.n essentiB y poSItive ac of the mind, the supremely positive
act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be striotly defined. In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found
myself acting on an intuition ~ ioh I possess without immediately know1ng myself to possess it--an intuition which cannot be,
striotly speaking, self-oonscious ICnd whioh can grasp itself
only through the modes of experience in m1ch its image is re ...
flected, and which it lights up by beine thus reflected in them.
The essential metaphys1cal step would then oonsist in a reflectior.
I

~-~----------------------------------------------------------------~
25 •
What is the nature or the import of this primary intuition?

In

~atery

sense it can be said that what has been defined as

8

is the objeot of intuition.

have to be made here.
give'n as such.

But some important preoisions

This intuition cannot be purely and simply

Properly speak1ng it is not something possessed.

Rather, it seems to be an assurance that extends across or underlies every rnovement of thought.

The more central it is the less

it is able to turn back and apprehend itself.

It oannot then be

~

directly

~eflected

in oonsOiOUS1'1ess. nor can l-t even_ be a1'-

pro;::ched exoept by a seoond reflection, ,",ihose funotion it is to
inquire iTom what origin it has been possible to make the first
reflection whioh postulated the ontological without knowing 1t.19
We oan perhaps olar11'y these notions if we oonsider
them in oonneotion i)';ith Marcelta approach to the oentral mysteries of being and knowledge.
oends itself.
1tself. 20

Kno"""ledge by its very nature trans-

Thought is always thought of something other than

This is to say that ?mile thought bears only on

upon this refleotion (in a refleotion 'squared'). By means of
this thought stretches out towards the reoover.f of an intuition
which otherwise loses itself in proportion as it is exercised.
"Reflection, the ~·;ctual possibility of' which may be
regarded as the most revealing ontological index we possess, is
the real place in whose oentre this reoovery can be made."

19

PhilosoPAl

20

Bei~ ~

2f

Existence, 13-14_

Havins, 30.

~____------------->--~t--------------------------~
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essences, by this very process of objectivation it does not exbaust itself.

The act of thinking cannot itself be adequately

represented; it can only be grasped as such.

Thus, there should

be no contradiotion in the fact of thinkine; of a mystery. 21
thiS it is olear that thou.ght is ir'1"1anen,t in being,

and

beine is immanent in thought, it also transcends it. 22
is not 11m:i.ted to particular beings; in

f"n

obscure

i"tay

From

while
Thought
it errives

at being in itself:
~

A blindfold knowledge of Being in general is implied

in all particular knowledge", But here, take c~u:'e in what
sense we use the words "Being in general." Obviously there
is no question of Being emptied of its individual OhE1XflCteristics. I should express myself better if I said th:".t
sinoe all knowledge oonoerns the thing and not the Idea of
the thing--the Idea not being en object in itself and being
1ncapable of oonversion into an object exoept by a subeequen

21

Ibid.
-Ibid.,
t

126.

22
36. As early as 1912 Marcel saw the neeeesi ty of this nO'tIOn for any kind of fl. realistic philosophy. He
speaks of it in relation to a philosophy of intuition, and it
would seem that at this tiMe the influenoe of' Bergson on his
thought was particularly stronge "Une ph11osophie de l'intu1tion
ne peut se oonstituer que sur IF' ba.se d tune dialeo'tique qui permettrait d'etab11r l'1mmanenoe de If8tre en tent qu-@tre dans
I t espr1t; une tel1e dielect1que elle-m~me suppose une critique du
savoir absolu qui mPn1feste la transoendanoe de 18 pens~e par
rapport au aavolr, et l'1ntu1tion m@me se r~duit flU fond A Ifaote
par lequel 18 pens&e a~f'irme qutelle est en elle-m~me transoendante A oe qui ntest en elle que pure objeotivit~." (tiLes
Oonditions d1e,lectiques de le ph110sophie de Itintu1tion," Revue
de m~tap~Si~ et morale, PariS, XX. 1912, 652.) Later, indeed,
trarce! s ronglY cautions thHt oar'e must be taken in the use of
the word 1ntu1 t1on, and 8,dds thDt it is Bergon' s theory of intell.igenoe whIoh above [.;11 needs revision. ( tfD~.l' Audace en
m~taphysique." Revue ,9;! m~taph.ysi que ~ morale ,III t If 08 • 3... 4 t
1947, 240.)
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thought-prooess of doubtful validity·-it implies that we Dre
related to Beine. 23
trhis entry
~ffo:rt

made at a time when :Marcel was making his greatest

WeS

"to break with every possible form of idealism.

On this

point at ls[:'_st the final decisive step is ma.de when he adds that
being is not affirmed, but it affirms itself. 24

Thus, the justi-

fication of the ontological realism of Marcel does not depend on
an epistemological inquiry:
• • • there exists \lvell and tru.ly a JllYstery of cognition;
lmowledge is contingent on a participation in being for
which no epistemology can account because it continually
presupposes it.25
It is based, then, on an ineffable and mysterious mode of participation in being, which we e:xperience by means of an intuition.
\'lc~rcel

de Oorte t s summary is particularly clefJI' and perletrating

on this point I
L'ontologie existentielle de M. Ga.briel rr,arcel se
ou semble se d~velopper. de 10 sorte, entre deux
intuitions du myst~re de l'existence: celIe qui engage
1 t ~tre qui Sf interroge sur sOi dans 1(;1 tot~li te de son ~tre
concret. at celIe qui ai;teint t au del! de cet enga.gement 1a
participation de ltexistencehuma.ine A Itint~gra1it~ merne
de l'existence ooncr~te. Ella stedifie dialectiquernent sur
un autre myst~re r celui de la conrul.issance, que nons ne
pouvons esp~rer de p~n~trer en s01 puisqu'e11e est
d~veloppe,

28. Of. the important text from
is, me semble-t-il, a priori, bien
~nt
pouvoir tout A fait justifier ames propres yeux cette
affirmation, que plus noua saurons reconnattre l'etre 1ndividuel
en tant que tel f plus noua serons orientes et corrone r;chemin~8
vers une sa.is1e de It&tre en tant qut~tre.u
Du Refus,

ae

23

Bains and

24

Philosoph? of Existence, 8.

~r;

-

HaVin~

193,-W-;.-:-j'al a

ThiN
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essentiellement experience globale immorcelable, transobjective6and transsub,jecti ve, en un mot, I?articipatiop elle

aussi.~

To return to our oonsideration of the self existing as
intimately linked with a body, we can now better understand the
status of the question.

If we are beyond the level of the prob-

lematic, how are we to anDlyse and elucidate this experience in
order to bring out its real signifioanoe

and

nize some of its metHphysical implioations?

perhpas even recogIt is in an initial

reflection that I think of myself as apax't from or in some kind.

A seoond reflection, however, brings

of relEltion with my body.

me to the recognition of the fallaoy of this disruption of ;:,
unity.

I pass beyond the disjunotions and articulations of ab-

stract thought in returning to
totality.27

t~he

conc::cete experience in its

Or, to speak more oorreotly, we are in a sphere

where we cannot even speak of any relationship,

The antinomy be-

tween myself and my body, interior and exterior, the same and the
other,

has

been dissolved or transcended from the start.

When I transfer

my

gaze to the world about me, I ex-

perienoe a oertain sreel which I also 00.11 mine.

This experience

26 La Phi1osophie de G.M., 10. l~erre Colin notes
that for Mflroelporticipationdoes-not deSignate, as in Platonism, the oommunioation of a same nature to different individuals.
but rather the rapMrt spirituel of two free beings who consent
to and ere united
tn "eaoh otner, eaoh respeoting the personalltlr
of the other. (Ex1stentialisme Ohr§tien; Marcel, ed. Gilson,

42-43.)
27

Du Refus, 34.

29
is in fact simply a prolongation of

my

•

experience of myself. 28

Beyond even this area of what 1s mine, everything that exists is
in an anAlogous relation to th2,t which binds me to my body and
roy possessions, fI.nd it is just the mysterious ::md intimate char-

a.cter of the latter which colors every existential judgement:
• • • moi ayant oonscienoe de mon oorps, ctest-a-dire le
saisissant A 18 fois comme objet (corps) et COI1E"le non-objet
(mon corps) voilA par rapport ~ quoi se d'flnit toute
existence. Afflrmer l'ex1stence d'un ~tre ou dtnne chose
quelconque, oe serait en somme dire: oet ~tre ou oette
chose est de m~me nature que mon oo~ps et appart1ent au
merne monde; seu1ement cetta homog~n~i te porte sans a.oute
moins sur l'essenoe (objective) que sur l'intimlte enveloppee dans 1e mot mien, mon corps.29

._~

It is interesting to note in the progress of l'.e.arcel' s

thought as he freed himself more and more from his idee,list formation and terminology the development, indeed, the transforruntion

of his notion of existence.

In his earlier years he had so

fta'

identified existence with objectivity that he believed thc.t one
could not say that God exists without converting God into an
ob jeot .30

Later, however, a.lthough there is no chflnee in Marcel t

28
29

~ Havins.

-Ibid.,

120-121.

JOUIT.k~ ~~tapAlsi~~,

9-'2.

305; cf. 261, 265;

Bein~

30 Journal M~taphysi9.ue, 156s "Existenoe et pr&dication. N'existe que oe qUi peut ~tre objet de pr6dioation. oe qui
peut ~tre rep~r~ (pour ~mettre un jugement d'existence, 11 faut
rep~rer PE~ pr~dicats).
Dtod une relation tr~s nette entre le
feit qutil n'y a pas de sens A dire que Dieu existe et l'impossibilit~ de lui attribuer des CBrAoteres. de 1e convertir en lui."
(Entry of December 14, 1918.)
---

30

•

idea of objeotivity, existence takes on [" new meaning for him.3 1
In reality, existence can never be dissociated from existing
things. 32
ble.

It is neither posit;ed nor conceived nor oharHcterilr.a.-

Rather, existence oen only be recognized as a pure immedi-

ate and

8.S

Fl

partiCipation.

Still later when Mflroel is strugglinl

to see the relation between being and existing. he adds that
there

OFill

be no idea of existenoe strictly speaking, beoause ex-

istenoe 1s the very limit or the ax1s of reference for thought
/

itself.33

As thought, too, 1s

£;

mode of existenoe, 1t is within

existenoe and as suoh cannot ref1J.ly go beyond it.

But it is the

speoiel privilege of thought that it oan in a. me[-;sure clbstraot
from existenoe for strictly limited purposes.

Howevel:', insofoI

as thoUfsht is aooompanied by knowledge and returns to being, the

abstraotion is reoognized for what it 1s @nd thought is egain
existenti8,l.34
Now, let us return onoe again to the oonsciousness of
the self as existing.

Att~he

level at which we have exemined

this experience, which properly speaking has been the level of
phenomenology a.nd not of ontoloeYt we have been concerned only

31 Ibid. t 309-329.
ence at objectiVrte.")

33

Ibid.,
-Bein,6

34

Ibid., 27.

32

(An appended essay entitled "Existr-

304.
~

Havins, 38.

31
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With exi:31ienoe ps enoountered in everyday experience and not wit
an absolute existence on 'which all other existents depend. 35

Ho '-

ever, we can probe more deeply into this experience D.nd see what
further it itnplies of ontol06icEl value.

When I reflect on the

fret of my incarnation and on my situation in the vlorld, 1 con
set up a dualism between the self as thinkine; and willing and th
absolutely contingent empirical self.

However, et the same time

I can go beyond this dualism in a reouperative second reflection
/'

which is a personsl and free act of thought. where I recog:nize
that I can no more place my situation in the world in quest;ion
than I can place myself in question. fmd where the e.pparent dua.l
ism is united in a. rapport that is non-contingent, i.e., that is
jot empirically determined. 36

Both myself and my Situation, as

well as my thinking and empirical self. are imrnediately present
to me.

Thus I recognize that my situation does not depend on me

but. on the contrary, I depend on it.

My situation transcends

me, but while it is true that I depend on it, it is not imposed
on me.

Hather, it is present to me and open to rrry free aoceptDn e

and ratification.

This 1s to say that interiorly I can either

accept or reject it.
F;

choice ,'klioh

And it is just at this point that I make

cO~lsti tutes

me as

[J

very being:

35

~stery

E!

Bei~.

89.

per;30nor whioh denies my
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La pOint de d~part dtune philosophie authentique--at
j'entends par l~ une philosophie qui est lfexp~rienoe transmu~e en pens~e, o'est; cependant IB reoonnnis:Jance cussi
luo1de que possible de cette situation paradoxf',le qui non
seulement est Ie mienne, mais me fElit moi. Je rappelle
enoore cepende,nt que cette situa"~;ion, si-radioale snitelle--et personne ne mettra jamsis 1 f 8,ccent plu::; fortement
que moi sur le. valeur u~t1me dtune certain ecceite--, ne
se laisse saisir que par rapport A une liberte qui est
dtabord et avpn~7tout le pouvoir de s'$ffirmer ou de se
nier el1e-m~me.
For V'.nen I ohoose to aooept B.nd open IiJyself to that whioh is beyond me I affirm that my personal 81 tuation cay!. ht,ve its foundation only in a personal and tri.. nscendent Absolute who has freely
~\'illed

both me and my 51 tuation 1n an at emporal and sovereign

[ ct, and I am thus no longer simply
~ willed by God. 3S

€t

contingent fact, but a 1>er-

In so relating my oonorete s1-t;uat1on to the

God who hee willed me I reoognize fully my own status as oreature
As my own being 1s present to me with the being of others, it is
not possible for me to possess my proper being without possessing the others and God, while, inversely, the presence of others
is the condi t10n of my true 'presence to myself •
. Strictly speaking, it is not from an Hct of thought
that this affirmation procedes, but nc:.ther from an f:ot of fC'i1th,3
involving the free and personal engagement of my v,hole being.

NeVi York,

37

~ ~efus,

38

Journal !Letaphysisue, 6.

39-40.

----

39 "Theism and Personal Rele.t1onships, ff Cross Ourrents
...;;.............
I, No.1, Fall, 1950, 37.

33.
ItL'esprit • • • ne se

cr~e

comme esprit que par la foi en Dieu."4(

This is to say that my spiritual personality is constituted in
the

unique and oriBin€tl relation established bet\>:een myself and

God by

my

personal free aot of faith.

Freedom is at the cross-

roed of tlle "I exist" and the "I believe."41

It is to be noted,

hOl':aver J that ,Me.Tcel does not concei va of freedom as simply being
an agonizing power of alternatives, of the option bet1';een affirmation or denial.

Reis more positive in his aru?,lysis, seeing in

liberty the joyous response to a freeing /call or invocation. 42
We have arrived f!,t a pOint t"ihich has perhaps been the
central conoern of Marcel's philosophical research. the act of
faith.

It was from the observance of this experience, in others

first more than himself, that he seems originally to have become
dissFtt1sfied with the systems of thought in which he had been
formed.

It continued to engage him as he realized more and more

its religious significance. and after his own conversion to
Catholicism it revealed new depths.

As we have already indicated l

Y:larcel remains on the philosophical level of' discourse.

Never-

theless, by the very orientetion of his thought, he sees a concrete philosophy

pS

necessarily open to Revelation fmd, in a

Metaphysisu~,

40

Journ01

41

R1coeux,

42

Ibid., 224 .... 225; ef. Mercel, .:Q!! Hefu8,

}~ercel

46.

II JHs12ers. 221.

34 •
sense, requirine it for the full understanding of the actual
!human condition.
Equally central to f.t1aroel' s thought, hov/ever, 1s the
human experience of love wh10h stands beside faith in value e.nd
sublim1ty.

Indeed, the two cannot be dissociHted:

Par Itt se trouve pos~ tt cat~ de l£{ foi 1 t amour. J t a1
dit ailleurs que 1 t amou:r est le cond1tion de 1a foi, et en
un sens, ce1a est vra1. Meis ce n'est 1t> qufun aspect. Je
orois quten r~a11t' l'amour et 18 foi ne peuvent et ne
d01vent pas @tre d1ssoc1es. Ilorsque le) f01 cesse dt@tre
amour, el1e se fige en une croyancepbjective ~ une puissance plus ou mo1ns phys1quement conQue; et d'autre part,
l' elllour qu1 n t est pas 1s f01 (et qui ne pose pas In transcendance du D1eu a1me) n'est qutune sorte de jeu abstI'a1t.
De mIme qu'A 1a f01 oorrespond 1a rea11te d1Vine (qui ne
peut @tI'e pens~e autrement quten fonotion d'elle), de mIme
A 1 t amour oorrespond 18 perfeotion d1v1ne. Nt l'un1te de
1a rea11t~ et de 18 perfeotion en Dieu, bien loin de dev01r
8tre entendue au sens des vieux 1nte1lectualistes (ens
rea1isaimum) ne peut se comprendre quten ionction de 1 t un1t&
de 10 f01 et de 1 t amour sur laque1le je viens d t 1nsister.
Je oease de oroire en Dieu ~ p~rtir du moment au je cesse
de l'aimsI'; un Dieu 1mparl'e.it ne peut ~tre r~e1.43

43
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE

0]1

~

A.

LOVE IN A CONCRET:E: })HILOSOPHY OF EXISTING

Triadic

~

!?ladic

Relatior,t.~

of

~~

There is in rea.lity a triadio relation in a.ny dialogue

-

between two persons.

There is the person speaking, the I; the

person spoken to, ·the

~;

-He

or It. 1

-

terior,

fl.S,

It makes no difference if the dialogue is wholly infor example, when

some action I performed.
sent.

and the ob jeQ:t of the dialogue, the

+am interrogating myself about

The three-fold relation is still pre-

Implicitly or explicitly I proceed by a dialeotio of ques-

tions and answers, a process which is essentially infonnative,
serving either (1) to instruct someone else about myself or about
a third thing, (2) to instruct myself about myself, or (3) to

lea:rn. from another about himself or some ot.her.

In any case and

at any instanoe in the discourse a judgement is brought to bear

on the object of the discourse, whioh is nlwFYs considered as
something exterior to the dialogue itself and independent of it:

1

Journal Mbtap!'Ssique, 145.

35

36

•

lorsque je parle de quelqufun A ls tr01si~me personne, je le traite comma 1nd~pend(mt--eomme sbsent--comrne
s~pa.r~; plus exactement je le dAfinis implic1ternent comme
exterieur A un dialogue en cours qui :peut @tre un dialo{:,"Ue
avec moi-m@me. 2
De m~me,

But to judge is to olassify.

To judee an individuf),l eXf'otly is

to classify him correctly, that is, to establish him in certain
common categories in such a way that

€:l.

oontinual reVision of the

initial classifioation will not be neoessary.

As such, the judge

ment has no ontological value, since it bears essentially on a
third person, an object,' that which is able to be placed in a
oategory.'

Thust to consider someone as

8!l

aggregate of qualitie

whioh c(';u be predioated of him is to treat him as an object, as a
third person, as not present.
On

the other hand, when I treat another as

(i

whole and

as transcending the order of questions and ansv.ers, I establish

a relation or a bond between us which admits of no third person.
!p'he rapport is here dyadio. and expresses
friendship or love. 4

f1

true pert1oi:pation of

The passage from pure dialectio to love is

made in so far as a person beoomes more and more profoundly a
Thou for me.
-ti811y
a!!!,

In reality, e.t a first meetinB the other is essenhaving only t;he form, so to speak, of

a~.

appear to eaoh other (and to ourselves) as "a such fl or

2

~.,

3

Ibid •• 161-162.
1'81(1., 155.

..

137.

"8

We
such

other."

37
•
But the more the other becomes a presenc.E!, a. spiritual

co-esse,5 to me and not just an object, the less he can be characterized
a "suoh." The beloved is
little as possible a
~'lS

;:~s

third person for me.

At the same time he reveals me to myself',

since the efficacy of his presenoe is such that I am less and
less a third person for myself. 6
• " • plus il stagit de oe que je suis comma totalit~ (at
non de ca que j'ai) plus la ~eponse at la question m@me
perdent toute sign1fioa<tion. Of
Between the two subjeots of love. then, there is no intermedie"ry.
Love is essentially conoerned with what is present and present in
its totality.

In love alone the individuelity of the beloved is

not dispersed or broken up into innumerHble abstrAot elements,
and it is in this sense tha.t only love can be called

H

true know-

ledge. a Whet is l~olly real,9 and it is to this that love is
direoted, 1s beyond all explication and ell reduction. 10 He who

5 Of.

?hilosoph~

of

~ence.

6

~purnal M~taphYs~,

7

~.,

a .!E!2.-,

25.

145-146.

152.
63.

Ib1d., 64 c "L t amour ne s t adresse don c pas a. oe qui
l'aime est en-soI s1 par ce qui est en soi on entend une essence.
Tout au contruire. Ltamour porte sur oe qui est au del! de l'essence, jtai dit dAjA que l'amour est l'acte par lequel une pensAe
se :fait libre en pensant une 11berte. Ltpmour en ce sens va I:.1U
delA de tout jugement possible, car le jugement ne peut porter
que sur l'essenoe; et ltemour est ls nbgation m@me de l'essence."
9

10

Ibid •• 6'3 ..

loves passes beyond a.ll judgemen'ts which classify the beloved,
beyond the level of objeotive knowledge which can only ignore
\VnCit

is transcendent:

"Et par Ill. 1 t amour est 1H

n~gation

de Is

connaissance.»11
If love is forbidden to judge, however, it is not necessarily blind.

Love cannot knowinely dissociate itself from

IDlowledge and still remain love.

It would beoome lost in 11lu-

siont
Ltamour doit s'apparaitre A lu1-m~llle oomma una connn1ssanoe
parfait, et. dans la m~sura o~ 11 n'est plus legitime de
dissoc1e 1c1 l' !tre de 1 t appc~ra!tre, on peut dire qu' i1
~ une oonnaissanoe parfait. 12
In reflection, however, love is seen to be distinct from knowledge and able to be defined as being beyond all know1edge. 13
It is. nevertheless, true that

BS

the lover is a thinking subject

he cannot i''ihol1y abstain from judging the beloved, but only in

11

-Ibid.
Ibid.

12
We must be careful, however, how we understand Maroel's-sti'tements on love as a kind of knmvledge~ His
qualifying words are important, for Marcel 1s I1wpre that the aot
of love 1s not the act of knowledBe, not even of intuitional knowledge; but he is aleo aware that it is the whole man who a.ets.
It is the proper chare,cter of love never -to become a mode of see ....
ing. Thus, there is no question of an 1ntu1tionism of love. (Of.
R1coeur, Marcel et Jas~rs, 83",) Love 1tself, as an experience
of transcenaence-;-rema a-on this side of sight, and its intention, as that of faith or hope, is revealed and its transcendent
signifioance manifested in the properly intellectual aot of seoond reflection.

39

•

so far

r~s

the beloved is the object of thought.

In the measure

in which the beloved is the object of love (which strictly speakj.ng

converts him from

made.

an

object to

a

subject) no judgement can be

One of the most important metaphysical formulas, notes

]'.8Xoel fifteen years before his conversion, is the Christian dictum, "Thou shE:lt not judge, ft14

, Love holds its privileged position of transcending
judgement becfJ.use it

has

received in itself the medietion of the

divine. 15 God, who is the absolute Thou; is inaccessible to objective fu"lowledge, and He ·wholly escapes judgement.
vation concerning God is a falsification;
Dieu, sachons bien que cen' est

pf".S

objecti-

"Quand nous parlons

In so far as oreatures participate in God, in so far

-de

Any

de-Die'll que noue parlons. If 6

present to each other as ,Thou t s rather t han

~,

.c.tS

they are

they, too tare

transcendent and escape judgement:

11 faut, je crois, partir de l'impossibilit6 o~ est
lfamant de juger It@tre aime et se demander A quelles conditions elle tient. tr'EAi d~jA dit que lte.mour qui s'inter"
di t toute r~flexion est celui qui a. subi ll:~ mediation du
divin. C'est-A-dire que atest bien en tant que l'~tre Gime
est pense oomne participant A ~eu qulil est p1ao~ dans
cet ordre transcendant par rr:pport A tout jugement, qu' 11
est conqu comme valeur absolue. Ou plut8t (ceoi pour ex·
clure toute interpretation psyohologiste) la justifioation

14

~.,

64-65.

15

Ibid., 64.

16

-Ibid ••

158.

40•
de 1 t pcte par lequel est rffirm~e oette txa-fi.scendance de la
crllature consiste dans celu1 qui pastule sa. filiation divine~17
Therefore t }'Jarcel concludes, really to love another is to love
him in God. 18
~1ust

we say then that love speaks only in the seoond

person, while judgement is limited to the third?
I can,

fo~

\'I;n11e such

In a sense, yes,

example, say to someone I love, "You are good."
a

Now,

judgement does not express the same impersonal Chftr-

ecter whioh it would if it were made in t.he third person, it does
carry with it references to a purely objective judgement.
judgement, "You are or you [:lre not such

a

If my

quality," is intended

to inform you of something about yourself, it is because I be ...
lieve there is something about you which you have not (at least
virtually) asked yourself and that, therefore, there is somethine in you which is of the -third person, an object, for yourself.

On the other hand, if I intend the judgement to inform you

about myself, i.e., that I believe you are such a quality, it is
because I consider that there is something of the third person
in me for you.

If absolute love were present this element of the

third person \!1.ould be wholly 2bsent,
Thou. 19

'There would only be· I

and

OonsequentlYt in i;he measure in which a judgement in the

17
18

-Ibid.,

ill!!.,

-

66.
158.

19 Ibid., 156-157.

r
41

•

second person is informative, it remains in the register of the
third person.

But in so far as it is

f:

movement of love • it S ob-

jeotive oontent is of little i~portsnce.20
In the preoeding chapter we said that the spiritual personality was truly oonstituted in the free aot of faith in God,
and also indicated the interdependence of faith PYld love.

Love

also, then, will have a function similar to faith in the oreation
of the spiritual person.

In order to affirm myself a.s e person,
,"

I must have present to me e 1hm! which is an absolute value in
itself, that is to say, an end in itself. which 08.n only be a
person.

I affirm myself as

1.

therfore, only in renouncing my-

self, in affil.1ning the value of others-thaD-myself.

The creation

of the self as a person and the clea:tion of absolute values is
thus a. simultaneous double creation of love.

Refleotion dis-

covers the harmony between two absolute and, at first Sight,
mutually exo1usive affirmations.

Of itself, love creates.

When

it stops creating in order to refleot on itself, it oeases to be
love, oeases to be the highest approxime.tion of being, for to
create is to go beyond the plane of objeotivation in order to
enter into the sphere of being.

Not to recognize that love is

distinot from and beyond knowledge is "to deny it as love.

~;hen

first refleotion discovers that there is nothing objectively

20 Troisfontaines,r;xistential1sme Qh!etient Gabriel
Maroel, ed. Gilson, 239.

..

42
there where love h,ps created a

~ ~ ~,

an~,

it is tempted

to condemn this creation as something false and devoid of' ontological value.

But in reality there is Em Us when love creates

-

it, and second reflection, denying the objective reductions of
the first, tiill recognize the properly ontological value of love,

-

area,tor of the personalities of the Thou and fJe, because oreator
of

-

Once the limits of first reflection are passed, secon<
refleotion allovvs room for liberty and creative love. 21
the~.

/

In oreating the very thing that it knows, love dispenses its own privileged knowledge,22 which, while not an adequate knowlede;e in the objective sense, is e, knowledge of itself
as acting.

This is to say tha.t love cannot be truly knovm as

love apart from the act of lnving, for I can only correctly think
of an act as an Ect if I refuse to objectify and immobilize it.
It is in this sense that a personality must be considered posterior to the act whioh constitutes it.

"L'amour cree l'amant en

t~mt qu' amant. "23

21 Troisfontailles, Exlstentlalisme Chretien, 242-243;
This paragraph is taKen from" a-resume Biven by Pere
Troisfont~dnes of a very long and abstract dialectic included in
an unedited notebook of Narcel's, which bears the title, Notes
;2hilosoph19,ues personne~, 191,-19 1 4.
Cf. n. 1.

22

Journal

M~taphysigue,

216.

23 froisfontaines, Bxistentia11sme Chrbtien, 245-246.
From another unedited notebook entitled Notes aa '9B~-1913:
"Ponr tE. th~se .. ft
_ .

,..
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Ra1s1ne a metaphysic[;!.l question.
does not bear on an objeot, on

~ln .!~,

M~;~rcel

•
If love

asks:

can we conolude that it

Vihile it might be agreed
-that the tra.nsvaluation whioh is at the base of love corresponds
bears on what we can cell the non-It?

to a. real transformation in the lover, is there necessf"Iily a
oorrelative modifioation in the beloved?
problem can be broken down as folloyg,:

Does love benr on

(1)

being a.nd not simply the idea of being?
being without affecting the beingr(

Metaph.ysically, the

(2)

Oan it beHr on the

Having advanoed to

Cl

position

of realism by this time (these notes were made in December,
1919)

,24 Marcel dismisses the first question as one about mioh

doubt is no longer possible,

However, later, and in another con-

text, Marcel again poses the question, although in a slightly
different form:
When I treat another as a Thou and no longer as a He
does this differenoe of treetment qualify me a.lone and my
f~tti tude to this other, or can I say that by treating him
as a Thou I pierce more deeply into him and Hpprehend his
being or his essenoe more directly?25
To answer the question thus posed, Mexcel first notes that essenCE
may be understood either as a nature or as

A

freedom.

As nature

the other appears to be identical with whe.t I am 9:'Ua nature, and
in so npprehending him I treat him

24

Journal

25

Being

('$

M~taEhls1sue,

~

Havins, 106.

a .!!£ and enclose him in c.

217-218.

44•
cirole within myself where the other becomes the idea of the
other.

The idea of the other is no lonc;er the other sua other,

but the other

fj.S

identioal with myself.

other in his essenoe

~ua

him when I treat h1m

BS

freedom,
a ~.26

Emd

The other remains truly

1 t 1s thus thHt I apprehend

Further, it is to be noted

that it is in h1s essenoe Sua freedom that the other can be affirmed as existing, for it is in this tht:,t he is other:
Not only do \tve have a right to assert thBt others exist
but I should be inolined to oontend/that existenoe oan be
attributed only to others, and in virtue of their otherness,
and that I oannot think of myself as existing except in so
far as I oonoeive of myself as not being the others: and so
as other than them. I would go so f?T as to say t~qt it is
of the essenoe of the Other that he exists. I oannot think
of h1m f:.S other without thinkinB of him ~1.S existing. Doubt
only arises when his otherness is, so to say, expunged from
my mind. 27
Regarding Maroel' s seoond question, a preliminflry considerntlon makes olear thc:.t the beloved is certEdnly not empirioally mOdified by the love he inspires, and thXlt included in the
total re81ity of each of us ere the sentiments we inspire in
others.
in~

Now, loan certainly think of my

love as

OMt

~

attain-

the being! love, but this is to treat us as distinot, as

separnted, by treatlnB myself in some way as
tween us.

fl

third person be-

But this is a love Vihich excludes faith.

Aotually

my love can exeroise an action on the beloved only in so far as

26

~'t

106-107.

27

~.,

104.

this love is not desire.

In desire I tend to subordinate the

beloved to my o'V'm etlds, and losir...g sight of his absolute v&lue,
I relegate him to the place of an object. 28

considering another

E'S

Consequently, in

a. ~ or a Thou, it is not siI:nply

tinction br:sed on different mentfl1 attitudes.

8.

dis-

There is, on the

contrer,y, a metaphysical validity to the distincti.on, since it

dom in rel.!}tion to me respected and assured. 29

is only as Thou that the other truly exists for me and

hi~)

free-

Perhaps. there-

~.

fore, only completely disinterested love, love free from all
traces of desire, is able to affect the Thou; "et cette
projetterait quelque

lumi~re

remarq~e

sur 1a fonction pratique de la

saintete. fl30
B.

;Havins

~

Being

We have said that love affeots being in the measure in

which this movement is not desire.

As opposed to love, desire

remains on the pl[;11e of having t ymich is identic8l with the realm
of the problematic. 31

What is the significance of this nevI dis-

tinction or opposition?

28

Journal

29

Being

30

Journal

31

Be1n3

Let us follow Marcel in his 6.nalysis of

M~taphls!S~'

~

218.

Having, 106-107.

Metaphli~19.ueJ

~ Havin~t

218.

166, 172.

the no·tion of having,32 which seems to carry V'ith it two references,

having"'Ea-posses;;;~ing

and heving-ps-implicption.

In the

former reference there is a certain :!uid relating to a certain
sui who is treated

a oenter of' inherence or apprehension. 33

HB

The !lui, however, is always impliCitly recognized as being on a
higher level than the Suid.

The movement of havine takes place

v..'ithin the gUi although it is externalized in the actual possession of the

~ui~.

Thus,

We oan only express ourselves in terms of havine when we Core
movine; on a level where, in vi,rhatever manner and whatever degree of transposition. the Qontrast between within and
wi thout retai ns CI mecming. 34
Now, when we consider the reference to having-sa-implication, as when we

SFiY

thAt a certa.in body ha,s a certain proper-

ty, the movement of having takes place and remains within the
9,ui, but even in this case the quid characterizes the qui while

remaining wholly other than it.
And. now we see the trEi.rlsi tion take place from the first
formula to the second one: we can only express ourselves in
terms of having, r:hen V'.e are moving on a level implying
reference to another taken as fmother" " " , The statement

32 The development of this notion is tt:1ken chiefly
from a paper delivered to the !Jyons Philosoph1cHl SOCiety in
November, 1933, entitled "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having,tf
included in Beine and Havin~, 154-175.
33

Beine:!E!! Having, 158.

34

~.,

160.

41
"I heve" can only be made over against another which is
felt to be other. 3S
A chara.cteristio note of Bll possession is its being

able to be shovm or displayed.
is only a. seoret as long

DS

Thus, a seoret the.t is possessed

it is kept, but at the

a secret only beoause it can be revealed.'6

same

time it 1

.As knowledge is some

thing that is essentially communicable it, too, 1s a mode of
having.'fl
At the basis of every form of'having there is e. tension
beti-'\'een the self and the other, a tension oaused

by

the very fact

that the other remains wholly other no IDF.:ltter how interiorized
the possession is.
sui~J

As

sepa.rate from the self, the other, the

has its own proper permanenoy

and

power whioh the self trie

desperately to suppress for its ovm ends.

B'lt, paradoxiccl.lly,

the more one is conoerned with the mastery over others or things,
the more he becomes enslaved to them. 38

This is particularly

clear in the case of my posses8ion of my body.
consider

My

In frct, when I

body solely as an instrument over which I heve com-

plete oontrol. I am expressing the archetype of' all forms of

35

~.t

161.

36

~ ••

160-161.

37

Ibid., 145.

38

Ibid •• 162-164.

having. 39

48•
The more, then, I treat

from myself but at the same time as

my
H

body &s somethiYlg distinct
possession to which I am

ptteched, the more it tyrannizes over me and destroys me by submerging me in this body to which I olinG_
So that in the last an::~lysis--and this is a new point
of vie-w--HaVing as such seems to have a tendency to destroy
8.11.d lose itself in the very thing it began by l)OSsessing.
but which now absorbs the master V'iho thought he controlled
it. It seems thEt it is of the veTiJ nature of my body, or
of my instruments in so fe.r as I trea.t them as possessions,
that they should tend to blot me out, althoueh it is I who
possess them. 40
/
However. in the measure in which our

posses~:iions

serve

as the immediate subject matter of a personal oreative act, a.s
in the cases of the musician's instrument, the gardener's tool,
or the philosopher's thoughts, havine tends to be sublimated and
trr::nsformed into being.
We may

nOVJ

be in a better position to understand the

differenoe in the directions taken by desire and by love.

Re-

maining on the level of havirlg, desire is oentered either on
oneself or on another as other.

t';'hile appearing to be hetero-

centriC, it is really autocentrio 41 in that it seeks to oenter
its objeot in itself.

.As JRcques 'Meritain snys in desoribing

the movement of desires

39

Of. MysteJ:'Y

40

t'ei~!!ES!

41

!!?!i.,

2f

Being, 97.

Havint,;;t 164-165.

167.

·,
tendency or affective overflow towards that
49

I have a
object which I will beoause it is good for me, and I produoe in myself, as it were, a spi!'i tun.l weigh': which drt-::ws
me towards it thnt I may inoorporate it into myself, that
it may be ~.42
But in love, on the other hand:
I have a tendency or affective overflow, towards this object
to which I will good because it is good, and I produce in
myself a spiritual weight, or impulse, by which I draw all
things and myself to this other being which for me becomes
an ~~' a subject, and to which I wish to be in some way
or ot er rea.lly united, as to myself. 43

Love, then, is the life v''ihich 1s deoente;:ed, which ohanges oen...
ter. 44
Love moves on a ground which is neither that of' the self,
nor that of the other s.ua other; I call it the 'rhou.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Love, in so fa.r as distinct from desire or as opposed
to desire, love treated as the subordination of the self
to a superior rea.lity. a reality s:t my deepest level more
truly me than I am myself--love as the breaking of the
tension between the self and the other, apperu's to me to
'be wha.t one might oall the essential ontologioF;l dntum.45
The world of having is that of the other as other, while the
world of being is th8t where the tension between the self and
the other as other 1s abolished in a single living reE1lity.

42

Jacques Maritain, Prefaoe 12. fi1etaphysios.

43

Ibid.

44

Marcel, Journal

New

York,

1939, 72.

~~~tep!\ysi9.ue,

217.

45 Being and Havin~, 167. k1d MErcel adds: "I think
and will S8Y 80 by t1i:'e"way, t:et the soienoe of ontology will
not Bet out of the soholastio rut until it takes full cognisanoe
of the fact that love comes first."

50

•
We think of our possessions [;s things of whioh we have
~he

risht to dispose.

But if \\e consider the notion of disposi-

pility from the point of view of the subject, vve see
.LS

th;,~t

having

essent1.!dly bound up with the self, it is fin anxious self'-pre-

::>ccupation.

Thus. when I am with someone who is

8.

non-dispos1ble

person, I a.m aware thBt I am with someone for whom I do not

~xist.46

On the other hand, oherity and love admit of' absolute

diSposibility.47

The person who loves totally co~nits his whole

Reine. to the Ofn'e of another.

A complete oommi tment is only

possible before God, however, who Alone hoa the right of absolute
dispospl.
~s

In the measure in which

E'.

person oommits himself'. that

to say, sacrifices his own being. so

transoendency over having.
of martyrdom oonsidered

E\S

witness: it
/",5

47

-Ibid.,

~.,

II

w1tness. fl48

non-disposable is a denial

IDI'W also be regc1rded as disposable, that is,

[the love of whe.t God may make of me. 49

46

does being assert its

"There lies the deepest significanoe

While self-love regarded

Iof being, self-love

fc~

Thus, the creE:ture

72-73.
69.

48 Ibid •• 84; cf. ibid., 127: " .... the soul most
essentially deulcated is iPi0TaCto the most disposable. Such a
soul wills itself to be an nsirumerlt; but S11icioe is the act of
denying oneta-self' as an instrument."

49

-Ibid.,

69.

51•
knowing

t;h:""~:

Whatever is positive t'Jithin him is derived from God,

knows that in disreg(,-3rding himself he is

disp,,~r8ging

God f s gift.

Not to Hcknowledge one's value as dexi ved from God is a radicf',l
perversion resul tine from the crer)ture t s approprie:l,ting rights to
himself which in fDct belong only to God. 50

True charity towards

oneself oonsists in regardine; oneself, not ['s self-sui':ficient,
but as a seed or a clumnel for spiritual

Efld

divine goods to flow

into the world. 51
In detaching itself more Emd more from having, the
spirit makes itself disposible for being.

It is the same dia-

lectical movement that turns the spiri 1; from problem to myst;erj t
from He to 'rhout from objective l{"rlowledge to Love.

o.

Su.mma.rl

We have attempted in these last two chR.pters to present
the philosophical views of'

Gabrielr.~Rrcel,

dwelling pnrticularl;y

on those aspects of his thought which would lead 'to an understanding of' the rale played by love in a Christian philosophy of
existing.

We regret the necessity of completely passing over or

merely alluding to many other facets of r':eIcel' s philosophy whioh
ofIer profound and bec.utiful ins1.ghts into the nature of human

50

Ibid., 88-91 n.

51

~

Refust 65-66.

experience.
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However. accepting the limitations imposed by our

purpose, we will restrict our summary even more to those points
which will elucidate the more properly metaphysical va.lue of
Marcel's thought.
While Marcel on several occa.sions concerns himself Ii'!i th
questions pertaining to the order of being

8.S

such, this is not

the natural habitat of his own original speCUlations.
true to his inspira.tion, lliiarcel returns immediately t
of the concrete existent.

Remaining
0

the realm

..-

However, the conclusions arrived at

on this level do have their metaphysioal significance:

• • •

plus nous seurons reconna!tre It@tre individuel en tant que tel,
plus nous serons

orlent~s

et comme

achemin~s

vel'S

Q~e

saisie de

Itetre en tant qut~tre."52
Now, a fundamental problem for Marcel, and one to which
he returns time and time again, is to show the ontological bearing of' the several ex.periences which he descxibes end analyzes.
Annexed to this problem is his desire to avoid subjectivism while
denying the position of pure objectivity.

Rejecting the validity

of the If:tter dilemma, Marcel attests the prirnFcy and trr;nscendency of being and establishes it in the order of the meta-problematio or mystery, which is not merely a denial of objectivity
but is rather a positive affirmation of its intelligibility in
itself.

There is no fundament81 obscurity in the world.

52

Ibid". 193.

The

53.
apparent obsourity is due to the mysterious nature of the link
uniting the self to the body, through whioh we have immediate
oontaot with other things.
But in a oonorete philosophy based on experience, the
attestation of being oannot be justified by a simple desoription
of the psyohologioal sta.tes oonditioninB the affirmation.

It is

neOess8Iy to justify it in terms of a deeper and ontologioally
valid

d~marohe

bear1ng on the speoific intentionality of the af-

firmation itself.

The global experience of existenoe which is

given in the awareness of the self's existence affords the basiS
for this affirmation, which is made explioit in refleotion.

But

the authentic affirmation, the true clttestation of being, oan
only be made at the lev'el where the antinomy between the sub jeot
and, the objeot is transoended, whioh is to say that the antinomy
is dissolved in a real partiolpE"tion in being.
This is the sphere of love, where alone presenoe and
partioipation, fidelity and invocation, have meaning.
situation in the world is oonstantly
lation and betrayal.
way for

m~m

thre~tened

Man in his

by despairt iso-

It is the philosopher's task to open the

to recognize his situation and to engage his whole

being in constantly renewed efforts to bridge the rupture between himself and others, " • • • a way whioh is undiscoverable
except through love, to which alone it is visible."53

53 J?hiloSQ1)]1v of Existenoe. 2Q.

54

•

The polarity of the self and the other, which is proper
~o

the sphere of having, is synthesized in the community of per-

sons instituted by the power of love.

But the human oowmmity is

itself a pf;trtioipation in the cc:ritative communion \l\:e seek to
establish with God, the Absolute Thou, whom we invoke in faith
~nd prayer. 54

comme subordination du soi A une r~a11oonstitue de la sorte le donn~e ontolog1que
essentielle. Seul il s'avere capable d'affronter lt~tre
sans que oelui-cl se volatllise en avoir, ear seul il est
epte A transcender la posltion dtune pena6e placbe en faoe
de l'8utre pour le selair et, du m~me coup, la rbtroveralon
mortelle par quoi l'autre saisit In pens~e et Ie dissout.
Une dlelectique pseendante de l'amour, portant A la fois sur
la rbalit6 et sur l'~tre qui l'apprehende, reconQant ~ tout
effort pour caract~riser le r6el, mais transformant at
aurelevant le substance de notre ~tre ecc6dant'ace reel,
sera Ie ressort d'une ontologie susceptible d'entrer humble-.
ment dans Ie myst~re du meta-problernatique et, en definitive,
de potre eXistence.55
L'amour.

t~ sup~r1euret

6prouv~

54 Collins, t1Ga,briel Marcel and the .'Mystery of Being,·'
Thought, XVIII, 681-682.
55

de Corte,

~~

?hilosoph1e de

~.

!., 39.

OHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
In the whole of Marcel's philosophical writings only a
comparatively few pages are cfevoted specifically to what might be
called the

metaph~y

sioa1 structure of love.

Nevertheless, Aimb

Forest is of the opinion that these represent an important contribution to the recent speculation on the problem of love:
Le propre de l'amour est dans sa p~nbtration. Son objet
ntest PBS seulement une id~e, une essence, i1 veut al1er
jusquta 1 f 8tre. et dans eette exigence i1 va se distinguer
du d~3ir. 11 deviant spirituel et d~sint~ressb dans son
r~a11sme m~me lorsqu t il depasse ce qui est ext~rieur, accidentel pour ohercher l'acces de la plus grande intimite.
Des remarques de ce genre sont aujourd'hui oomme 1es donnees
initia1es de toute phi1osophie de 1 t amour. Il faut sans
doute ohercher leur premiere expression ohez Gabriel Maroel;
les analysis subti1es du Journal meta~SiqUe eardent pour
1a pansee d t au j ourd t hUi la valeur pr~c euse-a'une d~couverte
et d'une orientation. 1
Wh11e it would be interesting to ascertflin the exact

influence of Ma.roel in this field, such a study would be beyond
the oapabilities of this writer.

We would like to oonsider, how-

ever, one or two instances of p.F;rallel lines of thought arnoIlB

1 A1m~ Forest, "Oonna1ssance et Amour, n
~ (Revu~ Thomist~), Paris, (no date), 113.
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oontempora.ry schola.stic

ri ters and indicc'!te where Marcel is in

T....

or disagreement.

~,grenment

Father

M~u'tin

C. DtArcYt S.

J.,

has recently published

a notable and erudite work on the historic problem of love of
self end love of others. 2

Literature, philosop~y, art, and ex-

perience of all times attest the presence of the two directions
of love in man, the love of the self and the love of' other personf
and God

\'\1.

thout regard for self.

Both philosophy and theology

have been concerned to show the difference or identity betvieen
them, and if they recognized the presence of a. problem due to
their difference, they attempted to offer a solution of one kind
or another.

Father D'Arcy reviews some of the pOSitions taken,

and while he himself arrives at the same conclusion as Inc:my of
his predecessors, he presents the problem and its solution in
somewhat different terms.
Man, D'Arcy tells us, is moved by a desire to take and
to possess everything for himself. but a,t the same time he is
also inclined to give himself completely, to sacrifice all of
his own interests and even his life for another.3
loves in man Are represented by Father D'Aroy as
the anima.

These two

the

animus and

The animus is masculine, domineering, possessive and

2 Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J. t
New York, 1947.

3

~ ••

316.

~he

r,'!ind end Heart .2f

~,

egocentrio. 4

57
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As looking to man's essence, it is represented on

the spiritual level by the mind, and it seeks the fulfillment of
man's nRture as man in drawing everything to 1tself, just as in
knowledge the spirit beoomes enriched in its possession of new
fonns.

The enirof.', on the other hand, is feminine.

is one of passiVity, subjeotion and surrender.5

Its movement

Anima is the selj

exolusive of reason, but having a specifll reference to the self's
spiritual aspeot, reaching beyond its own existence to Another
who gave it eXistence. 6
Man as the subject of both movements experiences the
tension between the tt"/O,
sire to give.

betwe~n

the desire to take and the de-

If one of the elements dominfltes to the complete

exclusion of the

other~

men is correspondingly false either to

himself or to his Oreator.

The animus itself turns the spirit

inward and oonsiders everything externnl as
end.

Fi

means to its o,m

In its extreme manifestations we see the epitome of self-

ishness. vanity and pride.

But if the animA is left unfettered

it, too, carries the soul along to destruction.

In the soults

desire to give itself without regard to reason it tends to plunge
itself into romemtioism and false mysticism.

4-

~.,

182.

5

Ibid.
-ill£!
.. ,

259.

6

It seems olear,
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then, that just as the two loves are present in man they must
be broue;ht in the proper

rel~tion

to eaoh other.

Everything is direoted aooording to its nature to oon-

serve itself and to realize its proper form as perfeotly as possible.

Now, in man reason, which is essentially self-regerding,

is the differentiating aotivity.

It is diffioult to see then how

the other love, the anima, can enter.
The only answer, the only true harmony • • • must be
sought in religion--in the oon~uniaa of the anima with its
divine lover. But even this will fail unless, as in the
Ohristian religion, the divine lover befriends animus as
well, and gives.pow~r to the unavailing soul to be led to
the altar with God;'
As Gabriel llaroel and others have pointed out, love

can only be between persons.

A human being oan never be a means.

It is this that is s 19nified when we call him a person t
When we use the word "person lf we do think of something
whioh makes a human being his very self in his independenoe
and Singularity; and pt the same time the word "person"
seems to imply a rela.tion. In other words, a person is one
who owns himself and is very muoh an "I", and et the seme
time, instead of being turned inward in deadly introspection,
like an idiot, he takes up a position in the world of reality and is aware of positive relations of equality or dependence or love with one or more other living beings. He ha.s
both a self-rege-rding love and a disinterested love. As an
essenoe he is proud, as an existence he is dependent. He i8
an absolute on a finite scale, a solitary who feels "angst"
and is full" of grandeur and misere. This is the nemesis of
a finite personality.~
Now, in the light of these notions about person we can understand

7

Jpid.

8

Ibid •• 320-321.

t

316-317.
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the self's reaching out to others Bnd to God, not to exploit them
as he

o~n

things, but to attend to them for whet they are in them-

selves, other persons, ends in themselves, at the depths of whose
being there is a region olosed to all save God.

Thus, it is be-

cause of the eminent dignity of the beloved, its own intrinsic
worth, thHt it is even oapa.ble of being so loved.

The will of' thE

lover reaohes its term and finds its appeasement, its joy, in the
good of the beloved.

Recognizing thatAin the relation of persons

there is a return of love, unequal though it may be, man can no
longer even ask whether he is ultimately loving himself, for it
is only in the measure in which he gives his love freely and with...
out thought for self that he 8nd his love are I>erfected.9

But

the self' has his own dignity as a person which he is charged to
watch over and sefeguard.

For this reason seli-love must act as

eo check on the other love with its tendency to trust itself inde ...
pendently of reason.

Both loves have to be kept straiBht by

truth, the conformity of the self with its essential nature end
the order of being to which it belongs.
divine love me$ the self drop all its

Only in the case of the

self-reg~rdt

and this is so

only because it knows that from Him oame its being and existenoe
and in Him is all l11:e. 10
The essential self is not, indeed, de8d--that oould not be

9
10

-Ibid.,
Thin ..

321-322.
.,2":1 • .,25

60

..

so long as a person remains a person--but it is the existential self, the anima, which goes forth to greet the divine
lover.11
It would seem that the tension which Father DtArcy describes between the a.nimus and the anima is the same as that dis ...
closed by Marcel in his analysis of having and being.

In either

oase, knowledge and reason are on the side of the animus or having.

Neither DtArcy nor Marcel, of course, is simply equating

reason to this possessive drive in man and setting up an absolute
opposition between knowledge and love.

'No, both are conoerned

here with what is recognized as a movement of desire in man as
opposed to a pure. disinterested love, but because of the similar
direction of reason considered. by itself and its proper activity
of assimilating its objeot to its own spiritual mode of being,
knowledge and desire exhibit like characteristics.

~~le

for

Father DtAroy this leads to the problem of the relation between
love and knowledge, he is able to avoid the position of the voluntarists who unheSitatingly assign ,to love and its

fac~ty,

the

will, an absolute superiority over knowledge and the intelleot.
DtArcy does not conoern himself with the problem to any ereat extent, but in an appendix 12 he quotes a number of texts from St.

11

-Ibid.,
Ibid.,

325.

12
304-307; cf. Pierre Rousselot. S. J., The
Intellectualisi'iiO'f St. Thomas, trans. J8mes E. Q'Mahony, O.T.
Oap., New~ York"; 193" 50-60.

Thomas showing that

D.

simple

unqu~lli:fied

choice bet\'veen love and

knowledge as the superior activity is not possible.
standing of

st.

A full under ..

Thomas' teaching on the nature of the intellect

in itself and in

m~n

and of his theory of knowledge enables FatheI

Dflrcy to indicate wherein the solution to the problem lies without completely subjugating either man's intel1ect or his \lvill.
Gabriel Mc;rcel f

01'1

the other herod t takes what c:ppeErs

to be the volmrtnrist pos1 tion on

t~e

quest io:~-, although, as has

been ind5.cated t he sorupulously avoids and condemns any recognized tendency in the direction of irr8.""GioX1£.lism or agnosticism.
Without desiring to oversimplify Ul8r0el t S profound thought, we
believe it can be stated that while he seems to perceive the
beRring of knowledge and attempts to expresS it, he is restricted
by preconceived notions on the

n~lture

of 1mowledge and reality.

fllc-tTcel reoogni zas thDt both knowledge

Hna

love

tJIe

direoted to the other,
-, although wi-tll different intentions. 13

------.

In

knowledge, and 1n its voliti.on[i.l counterpa.rt, desire, the subjeot
c=pprehends the object

.flS

other thEd1 itself and in

movement; seeks to break dovvn this otherness by
some

~\'r'y

into

fl

~:?

possessive

trt·msform~!. ng

it in

likeness of itself' by bringing it 'within the

subject's ow:'1 Circle.

This, however, is to disparage the

----.~,<-.-

13 Of. Aima Forest, ~ Structure m~taphysi~u~ du concret selon Saint Thomas dfAruin, Paris, 1931, 301. "Le probIIme
a:e-l' amour, - o"omme-'''oelui de a connaissanoe, est d t une certain
fElQon le pl'oblbme de l'autre."

existentif)l nE',ture of the other, to rob it of its rightful autonomy, and to deny its being.

Love, on the other hand, bears on the

other as existing and f',utonomous.

In its movement of penetration

and partioipntion love soars above the subject-object opposition
and finds its fulfillment in oommunion with the other, \"Ihere both
lover and beloved retain, or more oorrectly, realize their true
freedom in the recognition of the unique and sacred individuality
of the other.
/

Now, as Ai~e Forest points out,14 love and knowledge
[have an inverse orientation.

Through knowledge things become

interior to the soul and are made present to it in their similitude, whioh is not simply an image of' these things, but is rather
[the means by which the soul possesses them.

Thus, knowledge is

truly an experience of possession, of having in some way.
ithe direction of love is quite dif':.ferent.

But

Love seeks to unite

IUs to others, not in making them ours but in giving ourselves
over into the reality of the other.
an

~'.bHndonment

Love, then, is more akin to

of the self than to a possession.

In love the

subject tends primaril:\:: to perfeot the other, vvhereas in knowledge, and in desire, he tends to perfeot himself. 15

14

"Oonnaissp.nce et ;;:mour," Jfloques &1pritain, 114-115.

15 Cf. Nlaritain, Preface to Metaphysics, 72-73; and
Pierre Rousselot, S. J., Pour l'l}ii~~q~re (tu ;erobl~me 2!.
ltl:~mour ~ MOYf:.n i'fJe, Munster,1'9Os, 13-14.
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Thus far there seems to be no disagreement with Niflxcel.
But can

r"J~'l'oel

8dd with Forest that

the intelligence

El

.~,t

the term of its effort

itself places us in the presence of the onto-

lnBical mystery or that knowledge of itself can reveal to us the
meaning of existence and mys-r;eryy1b

It would not seem that M:a-

eel would subse:r'ibe to these statements without at least considerable qualifications.

While he has

[i.

deep oonviotion that the

intellect seeks more than a. knowled.ge of flbstrB.ct essences, he
does not seem to be able to situt=!.te knowledge fully and stably
in the transcendent

ordE~r

of

an~logicel

being.

Perhaps much of whAt has been said in the preceding
ch£ipters would seem to belie this, but as Nl, de Corte points
out,11 while Mpreel eertninly manifests a thorough epistemologiea.
realism, it is not quite so olear that he has arrived at a full
metl~phys1oal

stel>s:

realism.

Maroel himself recogni zes his faltering

"Thought turns tOWArds the Other, it is the pursuit of'

the Other.
Being. "18

The whole riddle is to discover whether this Other is
Nov~', atter thus correctly posing the problem to him-

self, Maroel seeks an answer in distingllishing between
and

thinkin~.2f.

16

thinkin~

In reoognizing that Actual thought is always

"OonnaissarlOe et amour," JaoSl,ues MFl.:ritain, 116.

11 La Philosophie de G. M..., 13-15; ot. Riooeur, Maroel
et ![pspers, 354-3;;.
- - 18

Being

~ Havi~BJ

30.

thought £f somethine other than itself, he affirms the

i)'lmf~nence

of thought in being, and then in a lengthy OlHlysis 19 to
returns from time to time he returns the question to the episte
logical level.

-

Instead of considering the ontological formality

of being as the object of knowledge, he limits the object of
ledge to the modality of being.

~~en

kno~

a philosopher's line of

thought is limited, to the fl'lay in which being exists as an object
for the mind and fails to note the ontological structure of oein"
or wha,.! it is in itself, epistemology takes precedence over and
remains p,pe.rt from metaphysios.
similar to what

There thus mny result a gap

find in Maroel between epistemological and

WE:

metaphysical realism.
This, we say. is the oonclusion to which Maroel is led
but let us note the more fundamental reasons for his pOSition,
It will be remembered thDt Marcel reoeived his philosophic train
ing in the idealism and rationalism of the nineteenth oentury.
Now, ideelism postu18.'I;es the irreduoible distil'lotion between sub
ject ana object in both the order of knowledge and the order of
being (in fpot, if not in intention).
definition of the

~erm

before or plpoed in the

£bjeot, i.e.,
f~?ce

Accepting the etymologioa
ob-jec~um,

of, idealism denies

something thrown
fmy

penetrabili y

of the object by the mind which would dissolve the antinomy by

19 ..IQ1g.

65..

an abstractive process of assimilation. 20

In allooating Hbsolute

autonomy to the mind and its ideDs, this philosophy ten.ds at the
same time to an ultra-objectivism and to complete ration6lism.
And it

CBU

conclude that "connaitre, c'est construire Ie concret

en vert'll
d'un
cl.cte
---de
-foi
- da.ns la

de Itesprit. 1t21

stabilit~

et dans Is veracite

While Mflrcel wes successful in ridding himself

of most of' the chains forged

by

idealism, he rebelled also Bgains

any form of ob jeoti visation, wl'lich he considered to be the 10gic8
~

issue of idealiszn.

In effeot, this

V":E:.S

simply to aocept the

fundamentF":l postulate of idealism, i.e., the radical opposition
between subject B.nd object on the plane of knowled.ge. 22

As

Etienne Gilson has shown so well,23 this is the fate of so meny
phil(sophers who revolt ageinst a system, but who, in their criti
oisms as well

[:lS

in their ovvn positive constructions, unconsoious

ly aooept either the prinoiples or the method of the philosophy
"they rejeot.
To deny to the spirit

f1ny

possibility of real

acces~)

to

other existents is to shut; it up irremed1ally within itself.
Henoe, MArcel affirms the necessity to reduce or transoend the

~,

20

de Corte,

21

~.,

50.

22

~.,

47.

~

Philosophie de G.

23 Etienne Gilson, The ¥n§~y £f
NewYork, 1947, espec1al1~9 - O.

~'J

47-50.
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opposition between subject and object, but he is unable to effect
the reduction on the plane of theoretic knowledge.

It can only

be accomplished for him through some kind of' concrete knowledge
by particip,ntion or connaturali ty. 24

To say with Marcel that knot/ledge bec>rs on essences is t
of COlU"'se, true,

But it is neither neoessary nor correot to stop

At least two important considerations must follow.

there.

First.

although in the order of' human intelligenoe conoeptual knowledge
is imperfect, this is not to ssy that it is a falsification of
real:tty.

If it is true that the proper object of the human intel

lect is the quiddity or the essence of sensible things, it follow.
that our knowledge bears on essences as they are embodied in concrete, particular things, that is,

piS

they are in reality.

liS

I\~8ritain says,25 if it is a question of experimental knowledge by

which 'Ie experience the thing in the singu18r and concrete reality of its presence, then it is very clear that notionel or conceptual YJ'lowledge is not real in this sense.
has ever pretended that; 1 t 1s?)

(And, he asks, who

But if' it is a question of

f'

kn.OYyledge whioh enables us to know and understan.o intelligible
beine truly, that is, in

~-,

manner conforming to

wh~1t

1s--1ntelli-

gible being, which is Pot the hea:r"t of the real and which 1s

24
~

!!

25

de Corte.

~ Philo~oEhie ~

Q.

M.,

51.

Jacques Meritain, ~teflexionf) sur 1 tint elligenoe et
~ EroE~~' 3rd ed., Paris, 1930,-;04=105.
--
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capeble of an inexhaustible certitude of itse1f--in this sense,
and it is this which is important,

notiont~l

knowledee is real

knowledge.
Obviously, what Mp'rcel is trying to arrive at is an explElnation of truly exi stentip1 knowledge.
cies of the pure concept for

0

He sees the inadequf:;-

concrete metaphysics, anc1 he sees

thet the act of existence is beyond the order of :fo:rm

~mcl

essence.

What he seems to fail to see is how the order of' concepts and the
.,/

order of the judgement, which, epis'),emologically, is the order Ol'
the act of existence, can be united in a truly scientific and
philosophical discipline.

"Intelligibility appears in two orders

-true metaphysios ignores neither but explores the deepest

that of form or essence and that of esse, the act of existence. n2E
A

in-

telligibility of whl":t 1s given in the concept in trle light of the
intelligibility of existence which 1s grasped in the judgement.
It is thus both concrete and realistic, and
.. " " its position at the peak of philosophical science is
clearly validated tor it deals not merely with quiddative
or form[~l intelligibilities but with the intelligibility of
that most intimate and ultimete 1'3.CtSJ,. esse, in the lie;ht of
which it alone considers {-ill things. , 7 Our second consideration is olosely connected with the
first.

As imperfect

~~ukee,

1951, 51.

1'1B

its mode of kno'\.vledge is, hwmm

26

Robert J. Henle, S .. J., Method in Metfiphysics, Mil-

27

.!!1:2.. t

58.
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intelligence oan in a limited way go beyond its proper object and
<.1'1'i ve at

E'

knowledge o:f' being in i taelf.

Texts

Vie

ha.ve oi ted

from Marcel clef,rly indioate that he is fJIVe1'e of this.

But here

the full development of his thought is stifled for two reasons.
As \-,'e have alrea.dy disoussed, he is first of all handicapped by
his preconoei ved notions of the nature of knowledge in rels.tion t(
the known objeot.

Seoondly. he seems oompletely unav,are of what

we mRY oall the world o:f analoey.

It is in truth an annlogical

lmowledge of being in general which we derive ::fl:om the knoj(jledge
of particular beings, not Simply t as
knowledge.

r~nrcel

holds J a nega!;i ve

Strictly speaking. Dcoording to this formf,lity 0:1:'

knowledge the object of intellection is not knov.n in itself.
r~athert

it is refleoted to the mind through its lesser amilogues.

The world of analogy. whioh 15 properly the sphere of metf'pilysios

where the highest oauses of :reElli ty are attained by the power of
abstr;3ction, may indeed be aa.lled trans-intelligible, since it is
not intelligible to us by experinental knowledge, that is. it is

not connaturnl to our mode of knowing,,28
Nevertheless. Mexcel does insist that knovdedge o:f being can be and. in fact, is attained.

If the foregoing 8JlBlys1s

is oorrect, it; would seem that rlleI'cel t s unde:rstanding of knowledge in gener;:;l prevents him from n:t:Tiv1ng at a satisfactory

---_._----28

Jacques M.E;r1tain, The Degrees of

y.nowled~e,

Bernard Wall end I;;:argot ldamson, Te\,'':-YOr1<, 1'9)8,

~6a-2

9.

trarHs.

69.
explant:ltion of how it is possible.

But now let us see what con-

clusions can be draVp.1 from wha,t he tells us specifically about inItuition.
Intui tj.on for MfiTce1 is clearly opposed to

~my

kind of

Jbstraction.

Hc:ther it is like pn intellectual symprhy 'with

presenoe.

has bes':1 brought out above t in.tuition is not

/\3

pf reflecting on itself' or
t

::>.

cEip£~ble

ot' being di::r'ectl;y ret"lected in though t.

is on this side of any Vision, but

IVhat is other than i tselt , it i3

fOS

of its nature it tends to

ir~medin)ely

broken up in a f'irat

reflection which objectivises the term of the :Lntuition. 28

Hecog-

'liz1ng that an integral objectivation is not possible, n second
ref1eotion attempts to :r9store the unity of the experience.
i3ingle act refleotion denies itself

E~S

In a

fm object and affirms its

",rl::J1scendence over all knowledge and all et> jecti vi ty:

o test sous Is. forme de la conn8.i:'3sance ob jAotiva que
1a ref1ex1on pense sa re18tion f.',U monde empirique; e11e est
savoir d'un mande qui est en lui-m@me stvoir replise; de
plus, 1 facte de se penser Ie pose pour elle-m~me com. .ne objet de saveir; meIs elle, dans cat ecta, se nie comma objet
et affirme sa tnmscendance AI' eeald de toutsavoir at de
toute objectivite, repoussf:mt comne im"deqlli';te toute representation, toute figuration. tOlli,a syrnbolisation d t e11em~me.29

~ile

it cannot be denied that r:r:Hrcel has given us

fl

new and

+--------28 Ma.roel, Journal metaphISi9,ue, 131: "Au fond toute
r-eflexion, toute difilect!que- e"St"Inv nciblem.ent at'tiree pax ce1E
~ui 11"', supprime--par cela ou elle se nie. f!

29 Jeanne Delhomce, in
bbriel !~Er.s.~~" ed. Gilson, 140.

EJ(i6~enti§..lisme Chret-i~:
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perhaps fruitful tool of' knmledge in his theory of' seoond reflection t 1 t seems olear thF.\t in the fU:::1otion thai; he 'c
t:rn>~scendent

it only a negative knowledge of

~1~)igns

to

reality is possible t

which for a positive metaphysics is not e;;oueh.

To deny to this

fundameffltal intuition the possibility of being ref'leoted in
thonght, and to deny to thought the possibility of knowing direct-

ly the object of the intuition, is to deny the intellectual perceptj.on of being.
step toV'u"rd a

Again Mr'roel 13 prevented from takine!he fineJ

metRph~:sical.

realisr.1 that is validly intellectual.

r':p,ri';a.in a.ssigns the cause of }larcel':3 :f'ailu..re on this pOint to
the same dif:ficul ty indicated above in the discussion. of' !,,;[,rcel' s
theory of mov/ledge gener~dly f;O

If £' philosopher l}:aritain is specificDlly referring
here to Marcell who is powerfully awC'.xe of the ontological
mystery nevertheless 1s convinced that it cannot be an intUition, it 1s because idealistic prepossessions do not
suffer him to a.ddress hiLsel1' to his intellect .ps such, :.;~nd
trust to it to sa.tisfy his sesI'eh. We cannot but see in
this attitude the effect of rm unsu:rmounted pre judice against the objectivity of the intellect, which is conceived
idea.listically. In consequenoe of this prejudice he will
seek to make contact with the ontologice,l mystery so to
speak by c' circuitous route which leads through the subjeoti ve dom~1.int therefore specifically by wey of' the obscure
r:pprehension of love, f\nd thus skirts the object \r'ie term

30 ITefaoe to !J;)etnJ2Ns~os, 60, n; cf Collins, ltGBbriel
tiarcel and the Mystery of'13eIng,"'I'r ~o~ShJ, XVIII, 691, n. 40:
"What Marcel woult1 dispute is his alleged reduction of intentionfility to a pure experienoe, together \!.Jith the ch[,:1"ge that he can ...
ceives the intelleot idealistlcf lly I',nd returns the discussion to
the subjeotive domnin • • • • On the traditional vie\,,'. the deliveranoes of Marcel's med1tp+:ions are true, but do not convey
formally ontological truth by ranson of pn incomplete disengagement of being from its concrete embodiment ff
1

being. This object, however, is not; screen, it is being
itself. ~'herefore love does not reDlly skirt it but e~1ters
it after its fashion, feS does intellect after its ovm. en
the "other side n of it there is only nothingness.
Now, to add that r:f)rcel ent ersthe domEin of being by
!Nay of the apprehension of love brines us to_B point where it
would seem that Marcel can be met by trc,d1 tionfi.l scholastic philosophy.31
In recognizinG that it is only through love that t: subject

c~m

go out from itself end enter into the very subjectivity

of a 11other, which is truly to sha.re in

t~le

other f s existeooe,

MFJroel simply affirms from, Another point of view
ar.:l soholastios, following

~;t.

WhE~t

contempor-

Thomas, indioate when they speak

of love as being more unitive than knowled.ge. 32

While the inten-

tional union of knowledge is metp.physioally c, more perfect union.
being more spiritual, it is less efficaoious pnd less intimate
than the affeotive union of leve, which does not presc1nd from

31 In viAW of the expos1 tion of r'·:f~rcel t s philosophy
given in this paper, it; 1s perhpas unnecessary to x'emark that
there are ma.ny other points on 1!\.hich rapI'ort o(Cm be established,
for example, on the plc::.ce of subjeotivity f·S a v(;,lid E'.prroDch to
philosophy, or, following the lines sketohed by de Corte (~
Philosol?h1e de G. rv:., 68-70), in the field of ethios or ot' practical KrioWIedge-where the judgement takes priority over the concept. De Corte believes th.rt it 1s here that ME,rcel offers the
grer:test pos1 ti ve oont:ribution to philosophy. Cf. L. B. Geiger t
o. r., ttFucistent1nlisme, essentialisme at ontologie eXistentielle,"
E.'tienne Gilson, Ph1losop~ ~ phrfotiente, edt J. :Maritain, .!!.

~., ~36~r.

32 E.g., Etienne Gilson.
Pnris, 1948, 384.

g

Thomisme,t 5th edition,
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the concrete oonditions of material existenoe.

The case is some-

whBt different when it is a question of union with God in the
Beatific Vision.

Here where union is the result of direot vision

whioh, absOlutely speaking, preoedes love,

M~xoelts

thought needs

modificat10n.
While in the order of purely speoulative knowledge one
oan speak of the rale of love only in relation to the love of
truth, in the order of praotioal knowledge it must be said that
~

love itself modifies knowledge,';

Thus, we see that in loving

another we oome also to a better knowledge of that other.

And

this is so beoause in love the other 1s present in his totality,
so to speak, enabling the one who loves to pass beyond a knowledge by concepts and know the other by a kind of connaturality:
Hon saulemant, lfamour pousse le sujet l soruter toujours plus 8vant les protondeurs de son objet, mats par lu1~
mime, il d1t pr'senoe myst6rieuse et r'oiproque de I'un l
Itautrej par In1.-mlme, i1 unit lfam.- et l'a1m', 11 les
"Oonnstura11se." de telle sorte que I'un n's qu'A se regardex' v1vre et sentir et penser pour oonneltre, tout autrement
que par concepts, leI r6aotions singu11~res de ltautre.34
What exists in the oonorete 1s subsisting things--sub-

jeots, not objeots-... a.nd, as s subject, the oone:rete existent 1s

inexhaustible to knowledge.

In the meS.sure in whioh we employ

oonoeptual knowledge in the attempt to penetrate another subject,
•

«

1945, 327.

"

Joseph de '1nane., S.

-

'4 Ib1d., 328.

J., .!l!:! .!! All,r.

Paris,
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that sub3ect beoomes an object, is oonverted from a Thou to a He,

-

-

and in that meusure 1s 1mpenetrable to us. 35 ,As Je,oques Maritain
as also Shown. 36 both the eXistential subjeot and the act of
existing transcend the concept oons1dered as the terminus of
simple apprehension.

We oannot, then. know another as subjeot:

Beins the only subject which 1s a subject for me in the
midst of a world of subjeots whioh my sense and my intelligence oan know only 8S objects, I am .-t; the oentre ot the
world • • • • With regard'lllto my subjectivity in 8.ot. I !!
the oentre of the world. J1
Maroel has described the transformation of objeot to subjeot in

-

-

the term1nolo81 of the He and !thou, where the one 1s un1ted to

In fine,
By love, finally, 1s shattered the 1mpossibility of

the other in the spiritual union of a vital co-esse.

knowing another except 8S object • • • • !o say that union
in love makes the being we love another ourself for U$ is
to say that it makes that being another sub3eot1v1ty for
us, another subjectivity that 1s ours. To the degree that
we truly love (which 1s to say, not tor ourselves but for
the belovedl and .hen....... which is not always the oase...-the
intellect within us becomes pass1ve as regards love, and,
allowing its conoepts to slumber. thereby renders love a
formal means of knowled8e), to this degree we aoquire an
oDsaure knowledge of the being we love, similar to that
which we possess of ourselves; we know thBt being in his
very subjeot1vity (at least in 8 oertain measure) by this
experienoe of union. Then he himself 18, in 8 oertain

35 Maroel, ~~ins and Ravin!, 13, n. ,. "the object .s
suoh i8 by definition e.ocessIDre to me, but not penetrable. It
1s the Other, or more exaotly the Thou, which is penetrable."

;6 Jacques Marita1n, Bx1stenoe and the Existent,
GHlant1ere and Phelan, 'Jew York, 194ft. t;3.- ..
'7

-

Ibid., 74-75.
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degree, oured ot his so11tudel he oan,' though still d1squieted, rest for a moment in the nest ot' the knowledge
that 'lie possess of him fl.$ subjeot. 38
In emphasizing the noetic funot1on of love, Karoel
recognizes the demands of any philosophy of the concrete.

If

suoh a philosophy is to l:lring us to a knowledge of things of this

VIlorid as they exist 1n their singularity and mater1ali"t;y, the
rele of love oannot be negleoted.
and necessity oalls

tor

On the contrary, 1ts importano

even greater oonsideration and expiana.tio
. ../

on the part of philosophers.

'Nevertheless, it must also be noted

that while the intelligenoe cannot do without love, ne1ther oan
love do without the intelligenoe.

As Maroel htmself statest

L'amour n'est plus rien, au moment o~ i1 se d188001e
soiemment de 1s. oonne1ssance!- du moment
11 sten d1s60016,
11 nlest plus (pour lui-mame qufnne conne1ssanoe illusoire
6t volontairement 1d'al1s'e. 9

au

50 Marcel affirms the demand ot love tor knowledge, but 1t 18
also true that he m1n1mi~es 1t in relegat1ng knowledge in itself

as a means of attaining the real in its several orders ot being
to an 1n:ter1or place.

It is, after all, not by his will that

man 1s differentiated from lower oreation, nor by his will that

he shares in his most perfeot likeness to God, bat rather by his
intelleot.
Iii

f

,0 -Ibid.,

84.

39 Journ!l m6tapAls1iue ,

6'_

75.

We bave indicated at some length Wherein Maroel seems
in the construotion of his partioular philosophioal views.
t 1s hoped that the line of oritioism followed is not too harsh
it will not be taken

expression.

A.S B

oritioism of the whole of

laroel has muoh of value to contribute to

ontemporary philosophioal speculat1on, c.nd his shortoomings are
ot due to the essential nature of his own philosophical insp1rt10n and orienta:t1on.

It has not been our purpose to give a

fmeral evalua.tion of Me.X"cel t s thought, but 1n conclusion we

hould like to note, 1n

c~eement

t would seem that a genuine and

with de Oorte and others, that
~al1d

philosophy of the oon-

ete,A Christian existentialism, if you wl11, i8 oertainly pos1ble along the lines proposed by Maroel. 40 It may well be that
uoh a pb11osophy (an onto-phenomenology as de Corte desoribe$
t)

cannot of

i~eelf

beoome a soienoe of metaphysios in the

riot sensa since it 1s

~8sent1alll

concerned with conoret1zed

eins and immediate experienoe, whioh
etaphys1cs of being.

~res~RRoses

a realist1c

Bevertheless, in the measure in which it

rees itself from the last traoes of idealism and recognizes the
of its data and ita method, 1t oan offer a valuable
philosophy striotly so-08lled.

40 de Oorte, La Pb110aOfhie de G. M., 77-105; Etienne
ilson, "Thomisme et les-pnI1osop~es· eiIstentielles." ~!!!
telleotuelle. FariS, June, 1945, 118.
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